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Abstract
This dissertation contains two essays that explore ways in which latent, short-term costs
shape consumers' purchase behavior, and consequently influence long-term outcomes. The
first essay, Modeling Consideration Set Substitution, examines consumer search, which in-
volves a trade-off of short-term effort for long-term utility. More specifically, it illustrates
the importance of accounting for consideration set substitution when modeling demand in
markets where consumers engage in search. Consideration set substitution refers to a con-
sumer considering one alternative at the expense of considering another. For example, if an
advertisement for the Ford Fusion induces a consumer to consider the Ford Fusion when he
is on the market for a car, this may cause him not to consider another vehicle he otherwise
would have, had he not seen the advertisement. The second essay, Frugality is Hard to
Afford, examines whether low income households are less able than higher income house-
holds to take advantage of intertemporal savings strategies commonly available in everyday
purchase categories due to liquidity constraints. Two strategies are investigated: buying in
bulk and accelerating purchase timing to take advantage of sales. Both involve trading off
the cost of an increase in short-term expenditure for the reward of long-term savings. Be-
cause low income households are more likely to face liquidity constraints, they may be less
able to utilize these two strategies. Together, these two essays contribute to our knowledge
of how consumers' purchase decisions are influenced by costs other than price. Essay one
aids our ability to measure consumers' responsiveness to marketing actions by more pre-
cisely modeling their decision-making process. Essay two contributes to our knowledge of
low income consumers' limited ability to make intertemporal financial trade-offseven for
seemingly low-priced goodsand why they may be less responsive to some marketing actions
as a result.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation contains two essays that explore ways in which latent, short-term costs
shape consumers' purchase behavior, and consequently influence long-term outcomes.
The first essay, Modeling Consideration Set Substitution, illustrates the importance of
accounting for the limiting nature of (1) search costs and (2) decreasing marginal benefits
to search, when modeling demand in product categories where consumers engage in limited
search. Specifically, it uses stated consideration set and observed choice data from the auto-
motive industry to explore an under-discussed and oft-overlooked consequence of these two
latent costs: consideration set substitution, which refers to a consumer considering one
alternative at the expense of considering another. For example, if an advertisement for the
Ford Fusion induces a consumer to consider the Ford Fusion when he is on the market for a
car, this may cause him not to consider another vehicle he otherwise would have, had he not
seen the advertisement (perhaps because he does not have time to test drive both). Consid-
eration set models that can accommodate markets with many alternativesthe very markets
for which modeling consumer search behavior is likely to be most crucialoften place strong
restrictions on the degree to which consideration set substitution can occur (e.g., assuming
it never or always occurs). Essay one develops a new consideration set formation model that
flexibly accounts for the role of search costs and decreasing marginal benefits to search, in
turn allowing the data to identify the degree to which consideration set substitution occurs.
Further, essay one shows that models that do not account for consideration set substitution
will systematically misestimate the impact of marketing actions and market events on con-
sideration and choice probabilitiesand, in turn, misestimate substitution patterns between
alternatives in the market. The findings of this essay highlight the importance of account-
ing for consideration set substitution when gauging the effectiveness of marketing actions in
industries where consumers engage in limited search.
The second essay, Frugality is Hard to Afford, examines whether low income households
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are less able than higher income households to take advantage of long-term savings strate-
gies commonly available in everyday purchase categories due to liquidity constraints. Each
purchase a low income household makes forces it to sacrifice liquidity, limiting its financial
flexibility in the (near) future. Consequently, low income households may be less willing to
spend money on products they do not anticipate consuming soon. Using data on household
purchases from the toilet paper category, this essay investigates households' tendency to use
two strategies that offer long-term savings in exchange for an increase in short-term expen-
diture: buying in bulk and accelerating purchase timing to take advantage of sales. This
essay first documents that compared to higher income households, low income households
are less likely to utilize these strategies, even though they are more financially incentivized
to do so. Moreover, a compounding effect is found. Because low income households buy
in bulk less often, they carry lower inventories, and are less able to wait for a sale before
purchasing again. Additionally, because low income households are less able to accelerate
purchasing timing to buy on sale, they are less able to buy in bulk, as sales make large
package sizes temporarily more affordable. Next, this essay provides causal evidence that
liquidity constraints inhibit the use of these money-saving strategies by low income house-
holds, above and beyond the effects of income group differences in brand preferences, access
to store types, access to transportation, storage space, or myopia. Finally, the potential
financial losses that lower income households incur due to the role liquidity constraints play
in shaping their purchase behavior is quantified. This essay's findings pertain to both the
deal-proneness and welfare of low income households, and this essay consequently has both
managerial and policy implications.
This dissertation contributes to our knowledge of how consumers purchase decisions are
influenced by costs other than price. Essay one aids our ability to measure consumers' re-
sponsiveness to marketing actions by more precisely modeling their decision-making process.
Essay two contributes to our knowledge of low income consumers' limited ability to make
intertemporal financial trade-offseven for seemingly low-priced goodsand why they may
be less responsive to some marketing actions as a result.
2
Chapter 2
Modeling Consideration Set Substitution
2.1 Abstract
Consumers purchasing from a large set of alternatives often evaluate only a subseta consid-
eration setin order to balance the expected benefits from search (e.g., finding a high-quality
product) with costs (e.g., time). If the marginal expected benefit from search decreases in
the number of considered alternatives, marketing actions that encourage consideration of
one alternative may discourage consideration of another. This paper develops a model of
consideration set formation that can account for this consideration set substitution. Using
stated consideration set and observed purchase data from the automotive industry, we mea-
sure the impact of marketing actions (vehicle redesigns) and market events (Toyota vehicle
recalls, T	ohoku tsunami) on consideration and purchase. We benchmark our model against
one that is commonly used in the literature but that does not account for consideration
set substitution. We show the benchmark model misestimates the impact of studied mar-
keting actions and events on market share by as much as 13%. Further, it underestimates
the frequency with which a gained consideration is converted to a sale. Lastly, although the
benchmark model often appears to fit the data well, its failure to account for the role search
costs play in consideration set formation causes it to infer critical quantities incorrectly, such
as the distribution of consideration set sizes and price elasticities, the latter of which are
underestimated by nearly 10%.
2.2 Introduction
Consideration sets can be thought of as an intermediate outcome of a consumer's search
process (Roberts and Lattin 1991, Mehta et al. 2003, Honka 2014). In categories with broad
competitive landscapes, consumers may not expend the effort necessary to learn about all
3
alternatives. They may instead construct a consideration set of alternatives to search over in
an effort to balance expected benefits (e.g., finding a high quality product or low price) with
costs (e.g., time needed to collect information or the mental cost of evaluating alternatives).
One consequence of consumers' limited willingness (or ability) to search is that marketing
actions that increase consideration of one product may in turn decrease consideration of
others. For example, if a consumer sees a commercial advertising the Ford Fusion, this
consumer might (a) consider the Fusion in addition to any other vehicles s/he would have
considered had the commercial not been seen (increasing consideration set size), or (b)
consider the Fusion instead of another vehicle which s/he would have considered (keeping
consideration set size constant). We refer to the latter of these possibilities as consideration
set substitution.
A wealth of literature has documented the importance of accounting for variations in
which alternatives consumers consider when modeling demand. Failing to do so will lead to
biased estimates of demand determinants such as brand valuations (Draganska and Klapper
2010) and price sensitivity (Mehta et al. 2003, Van Nierop et al. 2010). Moreover, optimal
marketing strategies generated by models that do and do not account for consideration can
differ substantially (Van Nierop et al. 2010). Consideration set substitution is a potentially
important element of the consumer choice process, yet consideration set models in the lit-
erature often enact implicit assumptions about the frequency with which it occursat the
extremes, either never (e.g., Goeree 2008, Terui et al. 2011) or always (e.g., Feinberg and
Huber's 1996 `quota' model).
This paper develops a new two-stage, consideration and choice model that can flexibly
measure consideration set substitution. Importantly for applications, the model admits a
closed form solution for which the number of calculations does not increase exponentially in
the number of available alternatives, so estimation is not impaired by the curse of dimen-
sionality. This makes it an attractive alternative to models with simplifying assumptions
that alleviate the curse of dimensionality but also restrict the degree to which consideration
set substitution can (be modeled to) occur. The model is also a useful alternative to more
structural models that do not admit a closed form solution.
A primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of flexibly and accu-
rately accounting for consideration set substitution when modeling consumer demand. To
this end, we model consideration and choice in the automotive industry. This industry pro-
vides a particularly appropriate empirical setting to examine consideration set substitution,
as previous research has shown that automotive consumers engage in fairly limited search,
typically considering only a small fraction of the (several hundred) available alternatives
(Hauser et al. 2010). Our data consists of 634,539 responses to the New Vehicle Customer
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Survey from 2009 through 2011. The NVCS is an industry standard regularly utilized by
Ford and other vehicle manufacturers to gauge consumer preferences, measure the effective-
ness of past marketing actions, and make decisions about future ones. The dataset contains
respondents' stated consideration sets, observed purchases, demographics, and purchase his-
tory information.
We use our model to estimate how consumer demand for automobiles changed in re-
sponse to marketing actions (vehicle redesigns) and market events (the 2009-2010 Toyota
vehicle recalls and the 2011 T	ohoku earthquake and tsunami). We compare these estimates
to those from a restricted version of the model that artificially constrains consideration set
substitution. The parametric restrictions employed reduce the model to one with implicit
assumptions about consideration set substitution that precisely mirror those of the model
previously used in Van Nierop et al. (2010). The differences between the models' estimates
highlight two consequences of not accounting for consideration set substitution. First, the
restricted model underestimates the frequency with which a gained consideration leads to a
sale, because it underestimates how often a gained consideration kicks a competing alterna-
tive out of a consumer's consideration set. Second, the restricted model misestimates the
considerations gained or lost due to a marketing action or event. For example, we find that
Toyota compact and mid-sized cars (C and CD vehicle classes) lost 4.9 considerations
and 2.3 purchases per 100 consumers in our sample due to the recalls, while Japanese C and
CD cars lost 9.4 considerations and 5.1 purchases. The restricted model overestimates these
losses by as much as 14%.
Additionally, the restricted model's failure to account for search cost leads to an interest-
ing resultthough it accurately estimates the average consideration set size, it misestimates
the distribution of set sizes. It consequently misestimates important quantities such as price
elasticities, which are heavily dependent upon a consumer's set size. The restricted model
underestimated the own-price elasticity of six redesigned vehicles by 9.9%, on average.
2.3 Related Literature
We discuss two streams of research to which the present paper hopes to contribute. The
first concerns methodological approaches to modeling consumer search and consideration set
formation; the second, the substantive literature on the role of search in the automotive
industry.
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2.3.1 Consumer search and consideration set formation models
Consumers in many categories do not consider all alternatives, instead choosing from a
small subseta consideration set (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990, Roberts and Lattin 1991).
How consumers construct this set has primarily been modeled in two ways. One stream
of literature models consideration sets as the outcome of an optimal search process (Stigler
1961, Weitzman 1979). Empirical papers are typically structural and model the consumer's
search process to be either simultaneous (e.g., Mehta et al. 2003, Seiler 2013, Honka 2014,
Honka et al. 2014) or sequential (e.g., Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004, Kim et al. 2010, Kim
et al. 2014), though some work has addressed which assumption is more appropriate for
a given context (de los Santos et al. 2012, Honka and Chintagunta 2014). Consumers
in structural search models are typically modeled as though they know a portion of their
utility for a product and that the population distribution of the unknown portion (e.g.,
normal with known mean and variance, as in Kim et al. 2010) is known to each of them. In
simultaneous structural search models, consumers are modeled as though they construct a
consideration set to maximize the expected utility from their choice from the set, less search
costs. In sequential structural search models, consumers are modeled as though they search
alternatives one by one (revealing the utility of each) and stop when the expected value of
continued search no longer exceeds a reservation utility.
A second stream of literature models the probability of a product being considered with-
out specifying a search process through which this probability is generated. One common
approach is to model the probability of observing each possible consideration set (as in Swait's
seminal 1984 dissertation). The probability of an alternative being considered is then a sum-
mation of the probabilities associated with each possible set containing that alternative.
This approach can quickly become infeasible as the number of available alternatives rises,
though. A common alternate approach is to model consideration as an alternative-specific
construct (e.g., Goeree 2008, Van Nierop et al. 2010, Terui et al. 2011). Consideration of
each alternative is modeled with a latent variable and alternatives enter a consideration set
if this variable exceeds some level (often set to zero for identification). We refer to these as
`level' models (as per Feinberg and Huber 1996). Models that do not specify a search process
have typically not accounted for consideration set substitution, as they (implicitly) assume
that consideration of one alternative does not affect consideration probabilities of others.
Both model types can accommodate markets with a large number of alternatives, but
each sacrifices something to do so. The (non-structural) consideration set models abstract
away from the cost-benefit trade-off associated with search, losing the ability to measure
consideration set substitution. A common limitation of structural search models is that
the probability of an observed consideration set being optimal typically does not have an
6
analytic solution, and numerical integration is needed to calculate the likelihood function.
An exception is the model used by Kim et al. (2010), but that model cannot be estimated
using individual-level data.
Our model mostly follows in the tradition of the (non-structural) consideration set for-
mation models, in that it necessitates neither an account of which attribute(s) a consumer is
searching for information about nor an explicit model of consumer expectations. However,
it does accommodate the possibility that the marginal expected benefit from search may be
decreasing, and can thereby measure consideration set substitution.
2.3.2 Search and substitution in the automotive industry
Other research has explored the role that search plays in the automotive industry. For exam-
ple, Ratchford et al. (2003) find that the availability of internet-based sources of information
leads to less search (fewer alternatives are considered), Zettelmeyer et al. (2006) find that
online information search helps consumers negotiate lower prices at dealerships, and Singh
et al. (2014) find that four information sources (dealer visits, print advertising, dealer web-
sites, and resale websites) serve as complements, rather than substitutes. Moraga-González
et al. (2015) show that price elasticity estimates are lower when limited search is accounted
for than when full information assumptions are applied. This is in line with past research
in other categories finding that full information models produce biased price sensitivity es-
timates (e.g., Mehta et al. 2003, Goeree 2008, Koulayev 2009, Van Nierop et al. 2010,
Draganska and Klapper 2011). Sudhir (2001) builds a structural model of competitive pric-
ing behavior to better estimate how pricing decisions affect market share. Berry et al. (2004)
use stated second choice data to improve measurement of substitution patterns in the auto-
motive industry. Here, we intend to complement and enhance this line of workspecifically,
to improve measurement of marketing mix effects (as well as the impact of market events
not controlled by the manufacturer) by accounting for consideration set substitution.
2.4 Data
We avail of cross-sectional data consisting of 634,539 responses to the New Vehicle Customer
Survey from 2009 through 2011. Each quarter, the survey is mailed by Maritz Research, Inc.
to consumers who purchased a new (unused) vehicle in the United States during the previous
quarter. The purchased vehicle is recorded by dealerships at the time of sale. Buyers of small-
share vehicles are oversampled, and each observation is given a weight to ensure that the
total proportion of weight assigned to a vehicle matches that vehicle's market share for a
given quarter.
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Survey respondents are asked to list any vehicles they considered buying other than the
one purchased. The vehicle make, model, and class are collected for both the considered and
purchased vehicles. 43.4% of respondents in our sample had a consideration set consisting
of a single vehicle, with 33.7%, 16.1%, and 6.9% having consideration sets of two, three, and
four.
The survey also asks respondents to list all other vehicles currently owned or leased and
to identify whether one of those vehicles is being replaced by the purchased vehicle. We use
these purchase history variables in our model. We also use a few sets of importance rating and
product use questions: those used to identify how important fuel economy and brand loyalty
are to a respondent and those that catalogue what a consumer uses their vehicle for (e.g.,
taking children to school or off-roading). The NVCS also collects demographic information.
We use the respondent's age, sex, and household income, which were the demographics most
highly correlated with vehicle class preference.
2.4.1 Sampling
Several screening criteria are used to reduce the dataset's size. We focus on compact and mid-
sized cars (C and CD car vehicle classes)by far the two most frequently purchased classes,
accounting for 33.7% of new vehicle sales (and 82% of non-premium car sales) between 2009
and 2011. We therefore include only consumers who considered at least one car, as C/CD cars
were unlikely to be co-considered with trucks, vans, or utilities (Table 2.1). We also remove
erroneous or incomplete survey responses and exclude a few respondents who purchased
vehicles with exceptionally small market share. We then sampled 9,000 respondents for
estimation. A detailed description of our sampling approach can be found in Web Appendix
2.1.
2.4.2 Summary statistics: vehicle redesigns
Measuring the impact of vehicle redesigns serves as a natural means of demonstrating the im-
portance of accounting for consideration set substitution, as redesigns are strategic marketing
actions undertaken by firms. Vehicles are redesigned on a cycle, with smaller refreshes (e.g.,
changes to the lights or seat fabric) occurring annually or bi-annually and major redesigns
occurring approximately every five years (an industry benchmark, according to Ford). A
major redesign marks the beginning of a new generation for a nameplate (e.g., the Toyota
Camry). Several vehicles transitioned to a new generation between the years of 2009 and
2011, with the Hyundai Elantra, VW Jetta, Subaru Legacy, Kia Optima, Subaru Outback,
and Hyundai Sonata being a few for which the new generation saw particularly large growth
8
in market share. The new generations of these vehicles garnered 95.1% more considera-
tions and 86.1% more purchases per 100 consumers in our data sample (Table 2.2) than the
previous generation during the three year period under study.1
The new generation of a nameplate often features superior styling as well as quality and
technological improvements. Manufacturers make these improvements with the expectation
that demand will increase, but the aim is not merely to increase market shareoften man-
ufacturers intend to charge a higher price commensurate with greater demand. This can
be seen in the data: for the six redesigned vehicles of interest, the new generation saw an
average inflation-adjusted increase in price paid of approximately 9.9% (Table 2.2) relative
to the previous generation.
2.4.3 Summary statistics: market events
Since marketing actions like redesigns are intended to increase vehicle demand, we also
measure the impact of two market events that decreased vehicle demand in order to provide
a comprehensive overview of how consideration set substitution shapes substitution patterns.
Toyota recalled vehicles due to safety concerns on three separate occasions during 2009
and 2010, with the final recall conducted in the first quarter of 2010. In the second quarter
of 2010, consideration of Toyota C and CD cars dropped sharply, from 28.4 considerations
per 100 consumers (Q1 2009 through Q1 2010) to only 23.8 over the next year (a decline of
16.2%). Purchases also dropped by 12.0%, from 15.1 to 13.3 (Table 2.3).
In 2011, the T	ohoku earthquake and tsunami disrupted the ability of Japanese manufac-
turers to produce vehicles and deliver them to the United States. Though this disruption
served as a supply shock, it also affected demand through consideration. From the second
quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2011, Japanese C and CD cars received 68.4 considera-
tions per 100 consumers. After the tsunami (Q2 through Q4 of 2011), these vehicles received
only 61.9 considerations per 100 consumers, a decline of 9.5% (Table 2.3). Honda and Toy-
ota took the brunt of the damageconsiderations for their vehicles declined by 16.8%, while
considerations for other Japanese manufacturers remained virtually unchanged. Though
explaining why consumers considered Japanese vehicles less often post-tsunami is not the
objective of this paper, there are reasonable explanations. For example, consumers may have
decided not to risk expending effort to search for information about vehicles that they might
not be able to purchase.
1The number of considerations and purchases a vehicle received per 100 consumers in our data sample
are the primary measures of consideration and choice that we report. Both are weighted measuresa
respondent with a weight of two will be counted twice. For ease of exposition, we will sometimes simply
refer to considerations or purchases, omitting the explicit reference to the scale and data sample.
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 make clear that the drop in considerations and purchases for Toyota
C and CD cars post-recall and for Japanese C and CD cars post-tsunami are not merely the
product of long-term trends. There are stark drops coinciding with the occurrence of each
market event.
2.5 Model Development
In this section we develop a model that accounts for consideration set substitution. Each
consumer i (i = 1, 2, . . . , I) receives utility uij from purchasing alternative j (j = 1, 2, . . . , J),
but this utility is not fully known to the consumer. Consumer i will conduct a simultaneous
search for information about all alternatives in his or her consideration set, Si, revealing uij
for j ∈ Si. From that set, consumer i will then purchase the alternative offering the highest
utility.
Our model is agnostic to which attribute(s) a consumer is searching for more information
about. Consumers may be searching for information about prices (e.g., Kim et al. 2010,
Honka 2014), product quality (e.g., Kim et al. 2010), specific product attributes (e.g.,
Koulayev 2014), among others. Instead of explicating consumer expectations over attributes,
we model the probability that alternative j will be considered by consumer i in a manner
that accounts for search costs and allows for the net marginal expected benefit from search
to be decreasing.
2.5.1 A simple consideration set model
Consumer i's latent preference for information about alternative j is given by ωij. ωij (which
we refer to as consideration propensity) consists of a deterministic (wij) and stochastic
component (ij, observed by the consumer but not the researcher):
2
ωij = wij + ij (2.1)
Recall that a consumer will learn his or her utility for an alternative j, uij, if j is included
in Si. A consumer's relative preference to learn his or her utility for any two alternatives a
and b (that is, to reveal uia or uib) is represented by the levels of ωia and ωib. If ωia > ωib, then
consumer i prefers to know uia, and alternative b will only be included in Si if alternative
2Consumer i is searching to reveal uij , not ij (which s/he already observes). wij does not represent the
portion of uij observable to the consumer, nor does ij represent the unobservable portion. wij is a collection
of covariates that are predictive of consumer i's propensity to consider alternative j, and ij represents the
portion of this propensity that cannot be explained by the covariates available to the researcher.
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a is included. More generally, the fact that consumer i has decided to search only for more
information about the alternatives in Si implies the following inequality:
ωij+ > ωij− ∀ j+∈Si, j− /∈ Si (2.2)
Equation 2.2 does not provide insight as to why consumer i only considers the alternatives
in Si and no others. It only reflects one half of the cost-benefit trade-off underlying search
and consideration set formation. However, if searching for information about alternative j
(including it in Si) incurs cost cj, then the consumer's objective becomes clear: search for
information about any alternative j for which ωij > cj.
In practice, alternative-specific search costs (cj) will not be separately identifiable from
consideration propensities (ωij). Instead, researchers commonly model consideration as an
alternative-specific construct (e.g., Feinberg and Huber 1996, Van Nierop et al. 2010), where
j enters Si if his or her consideration propensity for that alternative exceeds some level (often
set to zero for identification). The probability Si is optimal is then given by:
Pr(S∗ = Si) =
∏
j+∈Si
Pr(ωij+ > 0)
∏
j− /∈Si
Pr(ωij− < 0) (2.3)
The level model in equation 2.3 has a particularly attractive feature: estimation of
the model circumvents the curse of dimensionality. However, a notable limitation is that it
cannot account for consideration set substitution. The determination of whether alternative
j is worth considering depends only on ωij. Thus, a change to the deterministic portion
of consumer i's consideration propensity for any one alternative will not affect the consid-
eration propensity of any other. If, for example, consumer i sees a commercial advertising
alternative k, increasing the deterministic portion of consideration ωik and (correspondingly)
the probability that alternative k is considered, the probability of other alternatives being
considered will not change.
2.5.2 Consideration set substitution
If the cost of searching for information about alternative j is cj, then consideration set
substitution can only occur if the net expected benefit from search (Λij = ωij − cj) is
decreasing in the number of other alternatives considered. To see why, consider an example:
under a hypothetical set of market conditions, consumer i will consider alternatives x and y
but not z (Si = {x, y}). However, this consumer will consider z if s/he sees a commercial
advertising it. If Λix is decreasing in the number of alternatives considered, then:
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{ωix − cx|Si = {x, y, z}} < {ωix − cx|Si = {x, y}} (2.4)
It may be the case, then, that ωix < cx when alternative z is added to the consideration
set, even though ωix > cx without z in the set. Alternative x may therefore be removed from
the set as a direct consequence of z being added to it.
If Λij is decreasing in the number of alternatives considered, then either ωij is decreasing
or cj is increasing (or both). That the marginal expected benefit from search (ωij) might
be decreasing is fairly intuitive, and this effect has been referenced or modeled in past work
(e.g., Roberts and Lattin 1991, Kim et al. 2010, Honka 2014). The more alternatives a
consumer considers, the more likely it is that at least one will have a particularly low price,
be of very high quality, or otherwise be an especially good fit for the consumer. For that
reason, the expected benefit from adding alternative j to a set of size n is likely to be lower
than the expected benefit from adding it to a set of size n−1. It is perhaps less intuitive why
search costs (cj) might be increasing, but situations where this might be the case are hardly
uncommon. For example, choice overload might cause a consumer's psychological costs to
increase superlinearly in the length of search or number of alternatives considered.
We cannot separately identify whether the expected benefit from search is decreasing,
costs are increasing, or both. We can, however, account for the net effectthat Λij may be
decreasing in consideration set size. Since alternative-specific search costs are not identified,
we instead model the marginal cost of considering an nth alternative:
cNSi = c+
NSi∑
n=2
c˜n (2.5)
c˜n = c+ ψn ψn ≥ 0 ∀ n ψn+1 ≥ ψn0 ∀ n
In equation 2.5, NSi is the size of consideration set Si and ψn represents the degree to
which Λij is decreasing in n (ψn is consequently non-decreasing in n). c and ψ1 must be
normalized for identification (so c˜n = ψn), but the parameters ψn are identified for all n > 1.
Consumer i will add alternatives to Si in decreasing order of consideration propensity, ωij,
until no remaining alternative has a consideration propensity exceeding the marginal cost of
adding it to the set.
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2.5.3 Likelihood function
With the net expected benefit from search decreasing in the number of alternatives consid-
ered, the probability that an observed consideration set Si is optimal can no longer be cleanly
expressed as a product of alternative-specific probabilities (as in equation 2.3). Instead, we
identify a set of conditions under which Si is optimal and calculate the probability that these
conditions hold. Si is optimal if consumer i cannot be made better off by perturbing the
alternatives in the set. More specifically, consumer i cannot (1) remove an alternative from
Si, (2) add an alternative to Si, or (3) swap an alternative in Si with one excluded from Si
and be better off. These three conditions can be formally defined as follows:
No Removal:
ωij+ > c˜NSi ∀ j+ ∈ Si (2.6)
No Additions:
ωij− < c˜NSi+1 ∀ j− /∈ Si (2.7)
No Swaps:
ωij+ > ωij− ∀ j+ ∈ Si, j− /∈ Si (2.8)
In other words: (2.6) consumer i's propensity to consider each alternative in Si is greater
than the marginal cost of including anN thSi alternative in the set, (2.7) consumer i's propensity
to consider each alternative excluded from Si must be lower than the marginal cost of adding
it to Si (c˜NSi+1), and (2.8) consumer i's propensity to consider each alternative in Si must
exceed his or her propensity to consider each alternative excluded from Si. The probability
that these conditions hold for an observed set Si is consumer i's likelihood function:
pi(Si) = Pr[{ωij}j∈Si > {ωij}j /∈Si , {ωij}j∈Si > c˜NSi , {ωij}j /∈Si < c˜NSi+1] (2.9)
When ij is distributed i.i.d. Gumbel, the model in equation 2.9 generalizes the exploded
logit model in two specific waysit incorporates partial rank orderings (we know only that
alternatives in Si are of higher rank than those excluded from Si) and includes a means of
estimating the truncation point of the consideration set (via the search cost variables, c˜n).
Equation 2.9 has a closed form solution when ij is distributed i.i.d. Gumbel (somewhat
surprisingly, given the non-trivial additions it makes to the exploded logit model). The closed
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form solution is provided in equation 2.10. A proof of this solution can be found in Appendix
2.2. Appendix 2.3 also contains the results of simulation studies run to demonstrate that
the parameters βi and c˜n can be accurately retrieved in an estimation algorithm.
pi(Si) =
∏
j+∈Si
[1− exp(−exp(wij+)exp(−c˜NSi ))]exp(−a exp(−c˜NSi ))
+ exp(−a exp(−c˜NSi+1))− exp(−a exp(−c˜NSi ))
+
k∑
t=1
(−1)t
NSi
!
t!(t−NSi )!∑
q=1
a [exp(−(a+ bqt)exp(−c˜NSi+1))− exp(−(a+ bqt)exp(−c˜NSi ))]
a+ bqt
(2.10)
Here a =
∑
j− /∈Si exp(wij−), bqt =
∑
j∈Gqt exp(wij+), and Gqt is the q
th subset of alterna-
tives j+ ∈ Si of size n (of which there are NSi !t!(t−NSi )! in total).
Note that the solution, while complex, actually consists of only four unique parts: the
exponentials of (1) the consideration propensities for all alternatives j+ ∈ Si, exp(wij+), (2)
the consideration propensities for all alternatives j− /∈ Si, exp(wij−), (3) the (negative of the)
marginal search cost for the N thSi considered alternative exp(−c˜NSi ), and (4) the (negative of
the) marginal search cost for the (NSi + 1)
th considered alternative, exp(−c˜NSi+1).
Critically, the number of calculations in the likelihood statement does not increase ex-
ponentially in the number of available alternatives. Estimation is therefore not impeded the
curse of dimensionality. Though the third line of equation 2.10 contains 2NSi − 1 calcula-
tions (and is thus exponentially increasing in the size of the consideration set, NSi), these
calculations are merely 2NSi − 1 combinations of NSi terms; they are easily constructed in
an estimation algorithm, and take little time to compute, even for relatively large values of
NSi .
3
2.5.4 Relationship to level model and exploded logit model
The model presented in equations 2.9 and 2.10 is directly linked to two commonly used
models in the literaturethe level and exploded logit models. If marginal search costs c˜n
are estimated to be zero for all n, our model reduces to the level model in equation 2.3. Our
model therefore generalizes the level model, and can be formally tested against it to see if
the data support the hypothesis that consumers engage in consideration set substitution.
3This formulation works well in our empirical context, where set sizes range from one to four. There will
be some limit to the size of consideration sets that can be modeled. That limit will depend on computing
power and data set size.
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Alternatively, if search costs are removed from equation 2.9 altogether (not merely set to
zero), equation 2.9 becomes a simple rank order preference model:
Pr({ωij}j∈Si > {ωij}j /∈Si) (2.11)
Because the stochastic component of consideration propensity, ij, is distributed i.i.d.
Gumbel, the probability statement in equation 2.11 becomes a simple summation of exploded
logit probabilities (Chapman and Staelin 1982). Specifically:
Pr({ωij}j∈Si > {ωij}j /∈Si) =
NSi !∑
r=1
Pr(Rr) (2.12)
In equation 2.12, Rr is the r
th rank ordering of all alternatives in Si, and Pr(Rr) is the
exploded logit probability associated with this rank ordering. For example, if Si = {a, b}
and A is the set of all alternatives, then there are two possible rank orders (R1 = (a, b), R2 =
(b, a)), and:
NSi !∑
r=1
Pr(Rr) =
exp(wia)∑
j∈A exp(wij)
exp(wib)∑
j∈{A−a} exp(wij)
+
exp(wib)∑
j∈A exp(wij)
exp(wia)∑
j∈{A−b} exp(wij)
(2.13)
2.6 Analyses
We estimate the impact of vehicle redesigns, the Toyota recalls, and the T	ohoku earthquake
and tsunami using our model. These estimates are compared to those from a restricted
version of the model that artificially constrains consideration set substitution (our bench-
mark model). Differences between the two models' estimates serve as a barometer for the
importance of accounting for consideration set substitution.
2.6.1 Benchmark model
The level model is an attractive option for a benchmark, since it is commonly used, is prop-
erly nested in the proposed model, and does not account for consideration set substitution.
Because our dataset consists only of consumers who considered at least one vehicle, we can
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enact parametric restrictions to both the full and benchmark model (in a manner similar to
Van Nierop et al. 2010) to accommodate this feature. Specifically, the restriction c˜1 = −99
imposes that consumers will always consider at least one alternative. For the benchmark
model, we further restrict c˜n = 0 ∀ n > 1, which imposes that the first restriction is the only
source of consideration set substitution. In other words, the restricted model implicitly as-
sumes that consideration set substitution only occurs when a consumer with a consideration
set of size one is induced to remove the lone considered alternative from his or her set.
2.6.2 Alternative space
We model 54 C and CD cars available from 2009-2011. For vehicles in other classes, we
(mostly) model class-and-continent-specific outside options. One exception is that we model
Toyota and Honda vehicles from the B Car (super compact) and DE Car (full size) classes
as individual alternatives to facilitate more accurate estimates of recall and tsunami effects
(which primarily affected Toyota and Honda). For estimation speed and stability, we do not
model a few C and CD cars, nor the European B Car and Truck outside options. These
alternatives received exceptionally small market share. In total, we model 76 alternatives
that consumers can consider and purchase. Details are provided in Appendix 2.4.
2.6.3 Empirical specification of consideration propensity
For both the full and restricted model, we take a Hierarchical Bayesian approach to modeling
consumer i's propensity to consider alternative j from vehicle class l at time t:
ωijt = αij + γDjt + δRjt + λEjt + βXij + ηUjt + ijt (2.14)
αij = αj + ξil
(
ξi,C
ξi,CD
)
∼MVN(0, Σξ) Σξ =
[
σ2C σC,CD
σC,CD σ
2
CD
]
It is not feasible to estimate 76 fully heterogeneous alternative-specific constants (αij)
using only one observed consideration set per consumer (Andrews, Ainslie, and Currim,
2002), so we instead estimate heterogeneous preferences for our focal vehicle classes, C
and CD Cars (ξi,C and ξi,CD). A larger covariance matrix with more classes (e.g., super
compact B cars) was not empirically identifiable. We therefore rely on the covariates in
our model to explain heterogeneous preferences for other vehicle classes. σ2C is fixed to one
for identification.
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Redesigns are modeled using the set of variables Djt. We include a dummy variable for
each redesigned vehicle. For any redesign variable, the variable is equal to one if alternative
j is the associated redesigned vehicle and if consumer i purchased his or her vehicle during
any quarter in which the redesigned generation of the vehicle was available.
Rjt is the Toyota recall variable. For any respondent that purchased during or after the
second quarter of 2010 (after which all Toyota recalls had been announced), Rjt is equal to
one if vehicle j was (a C- or CD-car) manufactured by Toyota. Ejt is a set of five separate
manufacturer-and-class-specific variables that account for the effect of the earthquake and
tsunami on (1) Toyota C/CD cars, (2) Toyota vehicles from other classes, (3) Honda C/CD
cars, (4) Honda vehicles from other classes, and (5) C/CD cars from all other Japanese
manufacturers (bundled together they have approximately the same market share as Toyota
or Honda do individually). For any respondent that purchased during or after the second
quarter of 2011, a tsunami variable is equal to one if vehicle j was made by the corresponding
manufacturer(s) and comes from the corresponding vehicle classes.
Xij consists of 69 consumer × vehicle class interaction terms designed to control for
heterogeneous preferences. Consumer purchase history, demographic, importance rating,
and product use variables are interacted with vehicle class dummy variables. Ujt is a partial
unavailability variable, and can be thought of as a nuisance variable used to control for
abnormally low consideration or purchase for a vehicle in the first quarter of its availability
or at the tail end of its availability. Details about Xij and Ujt can be found in Appendix 2.4.
Consistent with past research (Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker 1996), Ford Motor Com-
pany has stated that vehicle price tiers, rather than price, drive consideration decisions. For
example, a low income household may consider several compact cars (knowing they are priced
economically) but never think to consider premium SUVs. More granular price differences
between vehicles are factored in by consumers at the choice stage. Since vehicles within a
class are similarly priced, Xij includes vehicle class × income interaction terms, while the
specification for choice utility (see section 2.6.6) includes price × income interaction terms.
2.6.4 Empirical specification of search costs
Since we only observe consumers with consideration sets of sizes one through four, c˜1 and
c˜n for n > 4 are not identified. Recall that c˜1 is set to -99. We set c˜5 similarly to 99 (i.e. to
values suitably close to -∞ and ∞ on the logit scale). We must fix one more parameter for
identification, and so set c˜2 equal to zero.
4 Lastly, we set c˜3 ≥ c˜2 and c˜4 ≥ c˜3 , in line with
our model's assumption that net marginal expected benefit from search is non-increasing in
4We could instead fix one alternative-specific constant from ωijt, but doing so leads to a great deal of
autocorrelation in our Markov chain.
17
consideration set size:
c˜3 = exp(θ3) c˜4 = c˜3 + exp(θ4) (2.15)
Heterogeneity (observable or unobservable) in search costs and consideration propensity
are not separately identifiable. We include heterogeneity only in consideration propensities
because doing so allows for greater flexibility. Variables intended to capture heterogeneous
preferences for vehicle attributes like vehicle class can absorb the impact of heterogeneous
search costs fairly easily (e.g., by estimating higher or lower consideration propensities across
all vehicle types), but the reverse is not so.
2.6.5 Identifying marginal search costs
Because point estimates for marginal search costs are (a) at least in part identified by func-
tional form assumptions placed upon the unobserved (to the researcher) component of con-
sideration propensity, ijt, and (b) the sole driver of consideration set substitution patterns
in our model, exogenous variation in the attractiveness or number of available alternatives
is critical. We have five primary shifters of alternative attractiveness or availability: the
Toyota recalls, the tsunami, vehicle redesigns, vehicle discontinuations, and the launch of
new vehicles.
If consideration set substitution does not occur in a market, then changes in the attrac-
tiveness or availability of one alternative should not affect the consideration frequencies of
other alternatives, and c˜3 and c˜4 will be estimated to be zero. However, if consideration set
substitution does occur, then c˜3 and c˜4 must necessarily be greater than zero. Consider the
Toyota recalls: If consideration set substitution does not occur in this market, then when
Toyota vehicles lost considerations after the recalls, consideration of other alternatives should
not have changed (if there were no other changes in the market at the same time). c˜3 and
c˜4 are identified (in part) by the degree to which non-Toyota alternatives saw their consid-
eration frequency rise in the aftermath of the recalls (and in part by consumer response to
other changes in the market).
2.6.6 Empirical specification of choice utility
Consumer i derives utility from the purchase of vehicle j, given by:
uijt = α
c
j + γ
cDjt + δ
cRjt + λ
cEjt + β
cXcij + η
cUjt + ζ
cPjt + εijt (2.16)
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εijt ∼ i.i.d. Gumbel
The choice utility specification includes all redesign, recall, and earthquake covariates
that were included in consideration propensity, allowing for the identification of which affect
choice, consideration, or both. There are three primary differences between the specification
of consideration propensity and choice utility. First, alternative-specific constants are mod-
eled as homogeneous in choice utility. Unobservable heterogeneity in vehicle class preference
is not empirically identifiable in choice utility due to the small sizes of consideration sets.
Second, Xcij (in choice utility) only includes a subset of the covariates from Xij (from consid-
eration propensity), because some of the interaction terms were not empirically identifiable at
the choice stage. Third, a set of four price × income interactions (Pjt) are included in choice
utility. Dummy variables for each of four household income groups ($0 - $24,999, $25,000 -
$49,999, $50,000 - $79,999, and $80,000+) are interacted with a vehicle price variable. The
price variable is defined as the (inflation-adjusted) average price paid by respondents during
quarter t for vehicle j.
2.6.7 Bayesian estimation
We estimate the parameters of model using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a normal
random-walk proposal. The parameters of
∑
ξ are sampled over the unidentified space using
Gibbs steps, and posterior distributions for the identified parameters are obtained by dividing
the draw for
∑
ξ by the draw for σ
2
C (McCulloch and Rossi 1994). We draw 8,000 values
for each parameter and dispose of the first 3,000 (burn in).5 The remaining 5,000 are used
to generate parameter estimates and credible intervals (Appendix 2.1). The consideration
and choice levels of the model were estimated separately. Note also that the choice level of
the model does not differ across the full and restricted models. Trace plots were checked for
convergence. Our estimation algorithm can be found in Appendix 2.5.
2.6.8 Simulation studies
The objectives of these analyses are (1) to measure how vehicle redesigns, the Toyota re-
calls, and the tsunami affected consideration and choice, and (2) examine whether and how
estimates from the proposed model (which accounts for consideration set substitution) differ
from those from the restricted model. For each model, we run a baseline simulation (using
5We use parameter estimates from a logistic regression run on our data sample as starting values for our
model's homogeneous parameters. This allows for fairly quick convergence.
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the model's parameter estimates) and counterfactual simulations wherein an effect of inter-
est (e.g., the recalls) is removed by setting the associated parameter(s) to zero. For the
redesign counterfactuals we also reduce the price of the redesigned vehicles to pre-redesign
levels. If consideration is higher (lower) for a counterfactual simulation than the baseline, the
event associated with the counterfactual had a negative (positive) impact on consideration.
The same is true for choice. Appendix 2.6 contains a detailed description of our simulation
approach.
In table 2.3, we compare the simulated considerations and purchases (by vehicle type)
from the baseline simulations to the summary statistics from our data sample. The simulated
results strongly mirror the data sample's summary statistics, giving us confidence that our
counterfactual analyses have an accurate baseline off of which to work from.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Parameter Estimates
The full model's parameter estimates (Table 2.4) for marginal search costs are greater than
zero (c˜3 and c˜4 are estimated to be .218 and .399, respectively), supporting the hypothesis
that consideration set substitution does occur in this market. The 95% credible intervals for
c˜3 and c˜4 are (0.189, 0.246) and (c˜3 + 0.149, c˜3 + 0.218), and the lowest draw (of 5,000)
from the posterior distribution of c˜3 was 0.175suitably far from zero. If consideration set
substitution did not occur in this market, one would expect a mass of points at zero in the
posterior distribution for these parameters.6
For the consideration stage of the model, the redesign parameter estimates for the con-
sideration level of the model were significant and positive for five of the six vehicles under
study (all but the Subaru Legacy). The Toyota C/CD car recall parameter (-0.242) was also
significant, as expected given the sharp drop in Toyota considerations post-recall. We find
that the redesign parameters and the recall parameter were n.s. for the choice level of the
model (Table 2.5).
The tsunami parameter estimates were also mostly significant at the consideration stage.
We have evidence that the tsunami hurt consideration of Toyota and Honda, but not other
Japanese manufacturers. One could have reasonably hypothesized that the tsunami would
have primarily had supply-side consequences for these manufacturers, possibly manifesting
6In practice, we constrain the marginal search cost parameters below at zero by making these parameters
exponential terms. Thus, we would not expect values of precisely zero for c˜3 and c˜4 if consideration set
substitution did not occur, but values very close to zero (e.g., zero to the fourth or fifth decimal), and would
expect that the posterior distribution for these two parameters would not converge in a region so far from
zero.
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as lower conditional choice probabilities. We do find this to be the case for Japanese man-
ufacturers other than Honda and Toyotaconsideration probabilities remained the same
post-tsunami (the tsunami parameter was not significant in the consideration stage of the
model), but conditional choice probabilities were lower post-tsunami (the tsunami parameter
was significant and negative in the choice stage). Interestingly, however, we find the opposite
for Toyota and Honda vehiclesconsideration probabilities for these vehicles are lower post-
tsunami, while conditional choice probabilities are unchanged. This result is striking. While
we cannot draw a conclusion as to why consumers reacted this way, the result is consistent
with at least one story: perhaps consumers anticipated limited supply, and adjusted their
consideration sets accordingly.
We find that wealthier consumers are (unsurprisingly) more likely to consider expensive
vehicle classes and that at the choice stage, higher income consumers are less price sensitive
than consumers with lower levels of income (Appendix 2.7).
The parameter estimates for the various controls we've included in the model can be
found in Appendix 2.7. Our estimates for the parameters intended to measure heterogeneity
through past purchase history are mostly positive and significant for the consideration level
of the model, indicating that (as would be expected) consumers who previously purchased
a vehicle type are likely to consider it again in the future. For example, consumers who
are buying a new vehicle to replace a previously purchased one are very likely to consider
the same nameplate againthe parameter estimate for this variable is 1.171, a huge value
on the logit scale. Some of these parameters are also significant for the choice stage of the
model, but not as many. The parameter estimates for demographic and other interaction
variables are fairly intuitive: consumers to whom fuel efficiency matters are more likely to
consider smaller vehicles; men are more likely to consider premium cars and trucks than
are women; consumers who rate themselves as brand loyal are more likely than others to
again consider a previously purchased manufacturer; and consumers who use their vehicle
for towing, hauling, and off-roading are more likely to consider larger vehicles such as vans,
utilities, and trucks.
2.7.2 Full versus Restricted Model
Recall that we benchmark the performance of the proposed model against a restricted version
of that model. The restriction employedthat the marginal search costs for all set sizes
except a size of one are equal to zeroreduce the proposed model to a level model similar to
the one used in Van Nierop, et al. (2010). The restricted model therefore can only account
for consideration set substitution in one specific circumstancewhen the lone alternative in
a set of size one is removed and another is added in its place.
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The restricted model's inability to fully account for consideration set substitution has
two primary consequences. First, the restricted model underestimates the conversion rate of
considerations gained by marketing actions or market events (the probability that a gained
consideration will translate to a purchase). The restricted model cannot account for the
fact that a consumer who adds an alternative to his or her consideration set (e.g., due to
advertising) may in turn kick out a competing alternative from that set. The restricted model
therefore overestimates the consideration set size of these consumers and underestimates the
purchase probability for the added alternative.
Second, the restricted model misestimates the number of considerations gained (or lost)
due to a marketing action (or any other effect of interest). This occurs because the restricted
model cannot take into account that some of an alternative's period-to-period gains are
substitutions coming from another alternative's losses (or vice-versa). For example, some of
the considerations that Toyota lost after the recalls were stolen by redesigned vehicles, and
would have been lost even if Toyota had not been harmed by the recall crisis.
Lastly, a third consequence of the restricted model stems from its failure to incorporate
search costs: the parameters of consideration propensity must be fit to both (1) the distri-
bution of consideration set sizes observed in the data and (2) the relative frequency with
which each alternative is considered. The model may fit one or both poorly without the
explanatory power of search costs (which truncate a consumer's consideration set). In our
empirical context, the restricted model fits the distribution of consideration set sizes poorly,
noticeably overestimating the proportion of sets of size one (54.9% in the restricted model's
baseline simulation versus 45.8% in the data and the full model's baseline simulation) and
of size four or greater (6.5% in the data and 6.8% for the full model versus 8.7% for the
restricted model; Table 2.6). This issue is likely to be less problematic if fairly granular un-
observable heterogeneity can be accounted for (e.g., fully heterogeneous alternative-specific
constants for consideration propensity).
Because consideration set sizes are not well captured by the restricted model, predicting
how the two models' estimates will differ is not straightforward. An additional complicating
factor is that, because the restricted model lacks the explanatory power of consideration set
substitution, other parameters will be used to fill the gap. If consideration of Toyota vehi-
cles is lower post-recall than pre-recall, the restricted model is forced to attribute increases in
consideration to other vehicles post-recall to heterogeneous differences across quarters. Con-
sequently, the parameters of Σξ are the only ones for which the two models' 95% credible
intervals do not overlap.
The remainder of section six is devoted to illustrating these consequences in the context
of measuring the impact of vehicle redesigns, the Toyota recalls, and the T	ohoku tsunami.
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2.7.3 Vehicle Redesigns
We find that the average redesigned vehicle gained 1.9 considerations and 1.0 purchases per
100 consumers due to the redesign. The estimated consideration gains were statistically
significant for five of the six vehicles. The purchase gains were significant for all six (Table
2.7).
The restricted model underestimates the frequency with which considerations gained due
to the redesign lead to purchase (the conversion rate). Table 2.8 illustrates this. Among all
consumers with a consideration set of size 2 in the full model's no-redesign counterfactuals
(averaged across all six vehicle counterfactuals), those who added the redesigned vehicle
to their consideration set in the baseline simulation saw their consideration set rise to (on
average) 2.70 (rather than 3.0, indicating that 30% of those additions supplanted a competing
alternative). By contrast, in the restricted model's simulation, their consideration sets rose to
3.0 (because no consideration set substitution occurs). The full model has a correspondingly
higher conversion rate, with 47.6% of considerations added to a set size of two translating
to a purchase (versus 42.4% for the restricted model). Similar patterns are observed with
larger set sizes. The one exception here is consumers who begin with a set size of one in
the counterfactual simulationsboth models allow for consideration set substitution for set
sizes of one (because each consumer must consider at least one alternative).
Table 2.8 also highlights that the restricted model overestimates the proportion of con-
sideration sets of size one (and greater than four). This can be seen in the last two columns:
the proportion of consideration sets of size one is 44.4% in the full model counterfactual
simulations and 51.0% in the restricted model's simulations. Because of this, the two models
actually predict similar degrees of consideration set substitution overall, and similar gains in
purchase due to the redesigns. The difference in predicted purchase gains by the two models
is particularly small for the Outback, which was predicted to have gained 0.83 purchases by
the full model and 0.84 by the restricted model (Table 2.7). In this particular example, two
wrongs actually do seem to make a right. But we should not conclude that the restricted
model is good enough for this empirical setting. The poor fit of consideration set sizes,
while balancing the scales for our redesign effect estimates, leads to unambiguous mismea-
surement of price sensitivity. We run a counterfactual (using both models) to estimate how
sales would have differed had the six vehicle redesigns been priced $1,000 lower. Table 2.9
provides the results. For any given consideration set size, the change (induced by the lower
price point at the choice stage of the model) in conversion rate of a consideration is the same
for both models (as expectedthe choice level of both models is the same). However, the
total (across all set sizes) conversion rate is higher for the full model, because the restricted
model overestimates the proportion of singleton consideration sets. Consumers with a set of
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size one will, of course, not be swayed by any choice stage variables, including price. The
restricted model consequently underestimates own-price elasticity for the redesigned vehicles
by an average of 9.9%. This can be seen in Table 2.10, which (for each redesigned vehicle)
lists its average post-redesign paid price, the percentage change that a $1,000 price decrease
represents, the forecasted percentage change in market share due to this $1,000 price decrease
(for both models), and the corresponding own-price elasticity estimates (for both models).
2.7.4 Market Events
We find that Toyota C and CD cars lost about 4.9 considerations and 2.3 purchases per
100 consumers as a consequence of the recalls (Table 2.11), declines of about 17.9% and
19.6% respectively. In total, 40.3% of Toyota's lost considerations were absorbed by other
vehicles. By contrast, the rate of consideration set substitution for losses due to the T	ohoku
earthquake and tsunami was only 36.3%. This is because the Tsunami affected many close
substitutesall Japanese vehicles. Of the considerations lost by Toyota due to the recalls,
12.2% were absorbed by other Japanese C or CD cars (28.1% by other vehicles). By contrast,
only 5.4% of the losses due to the tsunami were absorbed by other Japanese C or CD
cars (30.9% by other vehicles). With fewer attractive substitutes available post-tsunami,
consumers were driven to reduce their consideration set size more frequently. We estimate
that the tsunami lost Japanese C and CD cars 9.4 considerations and 5.1 purchases per 100
consumers (Table 2.11), declines of 13.2% and 13.6%.
The restricted model overestimated the considerations and purchases lost by Toyota due
to the recall by 11.2% and 12.9%. It overestimated Japanese manufacturers' consideration
losses due to the tsunami by 14.4%. Interestingly, even though lost considerations were no-
ticeably overestimated in the restricted model's tsunami counterfactuals, lost purchases were
only slightly overestimated (2.5%). This occurred because the restricted model underesti-
mated the rate of consideration set substitution that occurred in response to the tsunami.
More specifically, the restricted model underestimated the proportion of considerations lost
by Japanese manufacturers that were replaced by considerations of North American, Euro-
pean, or Korean vehicles. For intuition, consider this example: the restricted model may
have correctly estimated that some hypothetical consumer, X, did not consider the Toyota
Corolla as a consequence of the tsunami, but failed to recognize that consumer X replaced
the Corolla with the Ford Focus in his or her consideration set. If this hypothetical consumer
also considered the Honda Accord, then the restricted model would predict a consideration
set consisting only of the Accord (rather than a set of both the Accord and Focus). The
restricted model would therefore overestimate the probability that consumer X would pur-
chase a Japanese vehicle. This logic, applied in aggregate, explains how the restricted model
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might greatly overestimate the number of considerations lost by Japanese manufacturers
while only slightly overestimating the number of purchases lost.
2.8 Limitations and Potential Extensions
One limitation of our model is that consideration set substitution is a function only of
consideration set size, and not consideration set composition. By contrast, consideration
set substitution in the structural search cost model used by Honka (2014) is driven by
consideration set composition. That model can therefore account for some substitution
patterns that our model cannot. For example, if a consumer has a consideration set Si =
{a, b, c}, and wia is increased due to some marketing action by the manufacturer of alternative
a, Honka's model can account for the possibility that either b or c may no longer be worth
considering (because the benefit from including either alternative is decreasing in wia).
Our empirical analysis is limited by at least two factors. First, NVCS survey respondents
were given the option to list up to three vehicles they considered in addition to the one they
purchased. Thus, the respondents who provided consideration sets of four vehicles may have
considered more than four. We cannot know whether these consumers considered exactly
four vehicles or more, and so use these stated consideration sets as given. We note also that
there is a steep decline from the proportion of respondents who considered three vehicles
(16.1%) to the proportion that considered (at least) four (6.9%), so it is not unreasonable
to think that few (if any) respondents may have considered more than four vehicles.
Second, we excluded from our sample consumers who did not consider at least one car.
Consequently, we cannot measure the degree to which market events caused consumers who
would have considered at least one car to stop considering cars altogether (or the reverse). We
decided that including a larger number of consumers who considered the focal vehicle classes
(C and CD cars) in the sample was more critical to accurately assessing substitution patterns
in these classes than including consumers who exclusively considered trucks and utilities.
That cars were rarely co-considered with these other vehicle types made this decision easier
(Table 2.1).
Lastly, one potentially valuable extension would be to model search over a specific at-
tribute (e.g., price, as in Honka 2014). The proposed model is flexible in that it does not
require this, but incorporating such behavior could nonetheless be useful (e.g., to disentangle
the relative importance of price and quality search).
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2.9 Conclusion
Ample work has illustrated that accounting for consideration is critical to properly modeling
demand. In spite of this, there is a paucity of econometric models in the literature that can
both account for the cost-benefit trade-off that underlies consideration set formation and be
estimated for markets with a large number of alternatives. One especially under-discussed
element of the consumer's cost-benefit trade-off is consideration set substitution.
This paper develops a new model of consideration and choice that accounts for the fact
that an increase in consideration of one alternative may decrease consideration of others.
Moreover, it documents two primary consequences of failing to account for consideration
set substitution: (1) misestimation of the impact of marketing actions and market events,
and (2) underestimation of the rate at which gained considerations are converted to sales.
Additionally, this paper shows that models that do not account for search costs may poorly
capture the distribution of consideration set sizes, and consequently misestimate important
quantities such as price elasticities.
The model developed in this paper has several features (above and beyond its ability to ac-
count for consideration set substitution) that make it an attractive option for researchers and
marketing managers. First, the model is directly related to two commonly used modelsit
serves as an extension of the exploded logit model and generalizes the level model. Moreover,
it can be formally tested against the level model to determine whether the researcher's data
provides evidence that consumers engage in consideration set substitution. Finally, and per-
haps most critically, estimation of the model is not impeded by the curse of dimensionality.
The model is therefore especially useful for modeling markets with many alternativesthe
very markets for which consumers are most incentivized to engage in limited search.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Co-consideration of vehicle classes
C/CD B/D PrCar SmUtil Utils Trucks Vans
Sets containing C Car 75.4% 8.9% 6.0% 5.9% 2.4% 0.9% 0.6%
Sets containing CD Car 70.5% 8.1% 9.8% 5.7% 4.8% 0.8% 0.3%
This table provides the (weighted) proportion of vehicles from consideration sets containing
at least one C (row 2) or CD (row 3) car belonging to a class. E.g., 0.6% of vehicles in sets
containing a C Car were vans.
Table 2.2: Considerations, purchases, & price pre- and post-redesign
Considerations / 100 Purchases / 100 Average Price Paid
Vehicle Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif.
Elantra 2.3 4.7 93% 0.9 1.6 83% $17.7 $18.9 6.5%
Jetta 3.2 4.3 37% 1.2 1.6 29% $24.1 $23.4 -3.0%
Legacy 0.7 1.1 44% 0.3 0.4 41% $24.9 $26.8 7.9%
Optima 0.6 1.8 137% 0.3 0.6 121% $19.4 $23.6 21.7%
Outback 1.3 2.8 124% 0.4 0.9 120% $27.2 $29.7 9.3%
Sonata 2.5 6.1 138% 0.9 2.0 123% $20.5 $23.9 16.7%
Price Pre-RD and Post-Rd are the average of prices reported by buyers of a vehicle pre- and
post-redesign during the three year period under study. Prices are adjusted for inflation,
with Q1 2009 as the reference point.
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Table 2.3: Considerations and purchases per 100 consumers, by period
Considerations per 100 Consumers
Data Sample Full Model Sim Restricted Sim
Period 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
C & CD Cars 116 112 116 114 117 113 112 115 110
Toyota 28.4 23.8 20.8 28.4 23.8 20.9 29.0 24.1 21.1
Honda 25.6 22.7 18.4 23.9 25.1 18.4 24.5 25.8 18.6
Japanese 22.1 22.9 22.7 21.6 23.7 22.7 20.8 22.9 21.5
Other 39.8 42.2 54.3 40.3 44.1 50.9 38.1 42.5 48.8
Other Classes 69.3 66.5 67.6 68.8 67.6 68.1 68.0 67.0 67.5
Average Set Size 1.85 1.78 1.84 1.83 1.84 1.81 1.80 1.82 1.78
Purchases per 100 Consumers
Data Sample Full Model Sim Restricted Sim
Period 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
C & CD Cars 60.6 61.9 61.6 61.0 62.4 60.7 60.9 62.3 60.3
Toyota 15.1 13.3 10.9 14.4 12.2 10.5 15.2 12.6 11.0
Honda 12.5 11.8 9.5 12.9 13.6 9.8 13.8 14.4 10.3
Japanese 12.0 13.4 12.7 12.3 13.5 12.4 11.8 12.9 11.8
Other 21.1 23.4 28.4 21.3 23.2 27.9 20.2 22.5 27.2
Other Classes 39.4 38.1 38.4 39.0 37.6 39.3 39.1 37.7 39.7
Period 1 is Q1 2009 - Q1 2010 (Pre-recall). Period 2 is Q2 2010 - Q1 2011 (Post-Recall,
Pre-Tsunami). Period 3 is Q2 2011 - Q4 2011 (Post-Tsunami).
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Table 2.4: Consideration set model parameter estimates
Parameters Full Model Restricted Model
Search Costs Est. 95% Cred. Int. Est. 95% Cred. Int.
θ3 -1.522 -1.665 -1.402 - - -
θ4 -1.713 -1.902 -1.524 - - -
c˜3 0.218 0.189 0.246 0.000 - -
c˜4 0.399 c˜3+.149 c˜3+.218 0.000 - -
Heterogeneity Cov Matrix Est. 95% Cred. Int. Est. 95% Cred. Int.
Variance - Pref for C Cars 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
Covariance - C & CD Cars -0.300 -0.422 -0.187 -0.508 -0.576 -0.435
Variance - Pref for CD Cars 1.252 1.100 1.419 1.199 1.037 1.358
Redesign Est. 95% Cred. Int. Est. 95% Cred. Int.
Hyundai Elantra 0.745 0.511 1.003 0.767 0.556 0.992
VW Jetta 0.326 0.118 0.555 0.329 0.133 0.547
Subaru Legacy 0.305 -0.130 0.740 0.319 -0.194 0.831
Kia Optima 1.272 0.847 1.640 1.241 0.829 1.661
Subaru Outback 0.743 0.424 1.075 0.761 0.422 1.153
Hyundai Sonata 1.037 0.796 1.290 1.103 0.875 1.395
Recall and Tsunami Est. 95% Cred. Int. Est. 95% Cred. Int.
Recall - Toyota C/CD -0.242 -0.344 -0.132 -0.241 -0.355 -0.132
Tsu - Toyota C/CD -0.150 -0.274 -0.029 -0.144 -0.273 -0.023
Tsu - Toyota B/DE -0.769 -1.232 -0.345 -0.771 -1.192 -0.348
Tsu - Honda C/CD -0.371 -0.497 -0.239 -0.379 -0.499 -0.264
Tsu - Honda B/DE -0.423 -0.817 -0.062 -0.433 -0.807 -0.061
Tsu - Japanese C/CD -0.098 -0.216 0.029 -0.087 -0.194 0.019
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Table 2.5: Choice model parameter estimates
Parameters Choice Model
Redesign Est. 95% Cred. Int.
Hyundai Elantra -0.232 -0.789 0.267
VW Jetta -0.179 -0.652 0.284
Subaru Legacy 1.176 -0.009 2.332
Kia Optima -0.814 -1.882 0.176
Subaru Outback 0.506 -0.377 1.599
Hyundai Sonata -0.511 -1.184 0.011
Recall and Tsunami Est. 95% Cred. Int.
Recall - Toyota C/CD 0.020 -0.225 0.300
Tsu - Toyota C/CD -0.244 -0.580 0.084
Tsu - Toyota B/DE 0.717 -0.869 2.494
Tsu - Honda C/CD -0.196 -0.535 0.138
Tsu - Honda B/DE 0.220 -0.878 1.438
Tsu - Japanese C/CD -0.366 -0.679 -0.074
Price Est. 95% Cred. Int.
Price - Income Group 1 -0.156 -0.222 -0.093
Price - Income Group 2 -0.099 -0.139 -0.061
Price - Income Group 3 -0.097 -0.138 -0.061
Price - Income Group 4 -0.074 -0.112 -0.039
Table 2.6: Distribution of consideration set sizes
Consideration Set Size 1 2 3 4+
Data Sample 45.8% 32.5% 15.2% 6.5%
Full Model Baseline Simulation 45.8% 32.1% 15.3% 6.8%
Restricted Model Baseline Simulation 54.9% 23.9% 12.5% 8.7%
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Table 2.7: Simulated considerations & purchases per 100 consumers (redesigns)
Consideration Gain
Elantra Jetta Legacy Optima Outback Sonata
Full Model Estimate 2.54 1.24 0.33 1.56 1.51 4.06
Restricted Model Est. 2.48 1.16 0.21 1.57 1.54 4.20
Difference (Pct) -2.4% -6.9% -35.6% 0.8% 2.4% 3.4%
Full Model 95% CI
1.59 0.41 -0.16 0.90 0.87 3.07
3.56 2.24 0.83 2.33 2.16 5.08
Purchase Gain
Elantra Jetta Legacy Optima Outback Sonata
Full Model Estimate 1.45 0.65 0.34 0.81 0.83 2.00
Restricted Model Est. 1.39 0.61 0.25 0.84 0.84 2.17
Difference (Pct) -3.8% -6.3% -27.9% 4.1% 1.9% 8.4%
Full Model 95% CI
0.76 0.05 0.04 0.36 0.41 1.26
2.24 1.36 0.65 1.34 1.29 2.76
Consideration Set Substitution Rate
Elantra Jetta Legacy Optima Outback Sonata
Full Model Estimate 43.8% 43.8% 42.6% 43.6% 43.2% 42.7%
Restricted Model Est. 26.9% 28.7% 23.1% 24.8% 24.5% 26.5%
Difference (Pct) -38.6% -34.5% -45.9% -43.1% -43.2% -38.1%
Full Model 95% CI
33.1% 27.6% 0.00% 28.5% 32.7% 35.6%
54.6% 60.7% 75.7% 59.1% 53.7% 49.8%
For each vehicle, we list considerations and purchases gained due to the redesign and the
rate of consideration set substitution estimated using both the full and restricted model.
The restricted model's percentage over- or under-estimate is also provided (`Difference').
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Table 2.8: Conversion rate of considerations gained by redesigns
(1) Set Size (2) Set Size (3) Convert Rt (4) Convert Rt (5) % of Sets
w/o RD w/ RD (Sale/Consid) Difference by set size
Full Rest. Full Rest. Full - Rest Full Rest.
1 1.55 1.49 78.4% 80.5% 2.1% 44.4% 51.0%
2 2.70 3.00 47.6% 42.4% -5.2% 30.4% 21.6%
3 3.65 4.00 35.5% 32.3% -3.2% 16.9% 13.6%
4+ 4.00 5.87 31.7% 22.8% -8.9% 8.3% 13.7%
Wt. Avg: 2.46 2.76 57.9% 57.8% - - -
For consumers who considered any redesigned vehicle in the baseline simulation, but did not
consider that vehicle in the corresponding no redesign counterfactual, we report: (column
1) consideration set size in the no redesign counterfactual, (2) average set size in the baseline
simulation for the full and restricted model, (3) conversion rate of the gained considerations
(gained purchases divided by considerations), (4) the difference between the conversion rates
for the full and restricted models, and (5) proportion of consumers that began with a set of
the size indicated in column 1.
Table 2.9: Change in conversion rate of considerations $1K price reduction
Full Model Restricted Model
(1) Set Size (2) 4Convert (3) % of Sets (4) Set Size (5) 4Convert (6) % of Sets
1 0.0% 20.2% 1 0.0% 25.8%
2 1.8% 33.0% 2 1.8% 24.8%
3 1.9% 27.3% 3 1.9% 21.5%
4 1.8% 19.5% 4 1.7% 13.6%
- - - > 4 1.5% 14.2%
Weighted Averages:
Full Model Restricted Model
(1) Set Size (2) 4Convert (3) % of Sets (4) Set Size (5) 4Convert (6) % of Sets
2.46 1.5% - 2.80 1.3% -
For consumers who considered a redesigned vehicle, we report: (columns 1, 4) considera-
tion set size for full and restricted model, (columns 2, 5) the change in conversion rate for
considerations in sets of that size due to the $1,000 price reduction, and (columns 3, 6) the
proportion of consumers who had consideration sets of that size.
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Table 2.10: Own-Price Elasticities for Redesigned Vehicles
(1) Price (2) Purch Gain (3) % Change (4) Elasticity
Price % Chg Full Rest. Full Rest. Full Rest. Diff.
Elantra $18,895 -5.3% 0.076 0.067 2.4% 2.2% -0.45 -0.42 -7.2%
Jetta $23,402 -4.3% 0.070 0.059 2.3% 2.1% -0.54 -0.49 -10.5%
Legacy $26,819 -3.7% 0.020 0.016 2.7% 2.5% -0.73 -0.66 -8.4%
Optima $23,568 -4.2% 0.033 0.028 2.5% 2.3% -0.60 -0.54 -9.0%
Outback $29,718 -3.4% 0.044 0.037 2.8% 2.5% -0.84 -0.73 -12.7%
Sonata $23,937 -4.2% 0.099 0.088 2.6% 2.3% -0.61 -0.54 -11.5%
AVERAGE -4.2% 0.057 0.049 2.6% 2.3% -0.63 -0.56 -9.9%
We report the (avg quarterly, post-RD) price for each vehicle and the % change a $1K price
decrease represents (1); the estimated change in purchases resulting from this decrease, in
absolute (2) and percentage (3) terms; and corresponding elasticity estimates (4), as well as
the restricted model's % underestimation.
Table 2.11: Considerations and purchases lost due to Toyota recalls and T	ohoku tsunami
Full Model Restricted Model Diff.
Recalls - Toyota C/CD Est. 95% CI Est. 95% CI
Lost Considerations -4.92 -7.21 -2.52 -5.47 -8.12 -3.25 11.2%
Lost Purchases -2.25 -3.66 -0.88 -2.54 -3.98 -1.11 12.9%
CSET Substitution 40% 34% 47% 25% 20% 31% -38.2%
Tsunami - Japan C/CD Est. 95% CI Est. 95% CI
Lost Considerations -9.43 -13.37 -5.52 -10.79 -15.06 -6.39 14.4%
Lost Purchases -5.14 -7.31 -3.04 -5.27 -7.39 -3.10 2.5%
CSET Substitution 36% 30% 46% 23% 17% 31% -37.3%
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2.11 Figures
Figure 2.1: Toyota considerations and purchases per 100 consumers
Recall period begins after purple line, tsunami period after grey line.
Figure 2.2: Japanese considerations and purchases per 100 consumers*
* Excluding Toyota. Tsunami period begins after grey line.
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Chapter 3
Frugality is Hard to Afford
3.1 Abstract
Abstract Households commonly utilize strategies that provide long-term savings for every-
day purchases in exchange for an increase in their short-term expenditures. They buy larger
packages of non-perishable goods to take advantage of bulk discounts, and accelerate their
purchases to take advantage of temporary discounts. We document that low income house-
holds are less likely to utilize these strategies even though they have greater incentives to do
so. Moreover, results suggest a compounding effect: the inability to buy in bulk inhibits the
ability to time purchases to take advantage of sales, and the inability to accelerate purchase
timing to buy on sale inhibits the ability to buy in bulk. We find that the financial losses
low income households incur due to underutilization of these strategies can be as large as
half of the savings they accrue by purchasing cheaper brands. We provide causal evidence
that liquidity constraints inhibit the use of these money-saving strategies.
3.2 Introduction
Households have several strategies at their disposal to reduce per-unit spending on everyday
products. One set of strategies offer immediate financial savings in exchange for a decrease
in utility, such as buying cheaper brands, or shopping around to find better deals. In line
with the intuition that individuals who are most incentivized to save money would be most
likely to use these strategies, past research has shown that lower income households purchase
cheaper brands (Kalyanam & Putler, 1997; Akbay & Jones, 2005; Griffith, Leibtag, Leicester,
& Nevo, 2009) and search more for lower prices (Aguiar & Hurst, 2005) compared to their
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higher income counterparts.
A second set of money-saving strategies offers long-term savings in exchange for an in-
crease in short-term expenditure. For example, households may purchase larger packages to
take advantage of bulk discounts that offer a lower per-unit price. Similarly, households may
accelerate their purchase timing in order to stock the pantry when they find an attractive
deal. These intertemporal substitution strategies are commonly used for everyday purchases
of non-perishable goods. However, it is unclear whether lower income households are able
to utilize these money-saving strategies to their full potential. Even though lower income
households are more incentivized to save, they may face constraints that inhibit them from
increasing their short-term expenditure in order to obtain long-term savings.
This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to offer a thorough investigation
of the degree to which lower income households differ from higher income households in
their propensity to (a) buy larger packages that offer bulk discounts and (b) accelerate their
purchases to take advantage of temporary discounts. Our focus is on the choice to utilize
these money-saving strategies, conditional on their availability to the household. Therefore,
we study product and timing choices while controlling for each household's access to store
types and brands, as the prevalence of bulk and temporary discounts vary across both. The
second objective is to examine whether liquidity constraints contribute to the discrepancies
between lower and higher income households' propensities to buy in bulk or to accelerate
purchase timing in response to sales, even after controlling for other inhibiting factors such
as storage space, access to transportation, or myopic financial decision making. The third
objective is to quantify the potential financial losses that lower income households incur due
to the role liquidity constraints play in shaping their purchase behavior.
In service of these objectives, we analyze the toilet paper purchases of more than 100,000
households across seven years. We discuss the data source and important data patterns
in Section 3.4. The toilet paper category is tailor-made for studying the intertemporal
substitution strategies of consumers for the following reasons. First, bulk and temporary
discounts are both common in the category. Second, toilet paper is storable, therefore
purchase acceleration and bulk buying are feasible money-saving strategies. Third, toilet
paper consumption is likely to be steady and not influenced by the household's inventory.
Steady consumption is a significant benefit when studying decisions involving intertemporal
substitution and inventory and consumption must be inferred from purchases (Ailawadi &
Neslin, 1998; Silva-Risso, Bucklin, & Morrison, 1999; Erdem, Imai, & Keane, 2003; Hendel &
Nevo, 2006a; Ailawadi, Lutzky, & Neslin, 2007). Fourth, a household's need for toilet cannot
be satisfied by other product categories, therefore purchasing behavior in the category is
unlikely to be influenced by substitution to or from other categories. Finally, the simplicity
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of attributes of products in this category allows us to pool our analyses across products
using a standardized unit of toilet paper. Other categories, such as laundry detergent, soda,
and diapers, feature greater differentiation between products based on a higher dimension
of attributes, necessitating stronger assumptions regarding comparability across products.
Our first set of analyses examines the relative frequency with which lower and higher
income households (a) buy in bulk and (b) accelerate purchase timing to take advantage
of a sale. The results presented in Section 3.5 indicate that lower income households are
less likely than higher income households to utilize both strategies, even after controlling for
differences across income groups in households' access to store types and brands. Making
matters worse for lower income households, these two purchase behaviors have compounding
effects on one another. A high level of inventory provides a household with more time until
they run out of inventory, allowing them to time their purchases to take advantage of a
price discount. Lower income households maintain lower inventory levels because they do
not buy in bulk. As a result, they are more likely to run low on toilet paper, and thus need
to purchase even when the prices are not favorable. In sum, the inability to buy in bulk
also prevents the lower income households from timing their purchases to take advantage of
sales. In return, the inability of lower income households to time their purchases to buy on
sale further inhibits their ability to purchase large package sizes, as large package sizes are
more affordable when on sale.
To test whether liquidity constraints play a role in shaping these purchase behaviors,
in Section 3.6, we compare each household's purchases made during the first week of the
monthwhen its liquidity constraints are partially relaxed by the receipt of paychecks (and
in some cases, food stamps)to its purchases made during the rest of the month. We find
that lower income households buy larger packages and accelerate their purchases in order to
take advantage of a sale to a greater degree during the first week of the month than during
the rest of the month. By contrast, the purchase behavior of higher income households differs
to a lesser degree between these two periods. Importantly, the receipt of paychecks and food
stamps does not affect the geographic location of a household, its ability to plan for future
consumption, its storage space, its transportation options, or the set of brands available
at nearby stores. Consequently, our empirical approach identifies the impact of liquidity
constraints on purchase behavior, above and beyond any effect that these other factors may
have. The results indicate that lower income households would utilize these money-saving
strategies more often, if they could afford them.
In Section 3.7, we quantify a lower-bound of the potential for economic harm to low
income households stemming from their relative inability to buy in bulk and to accelerate
their purchase timing to take advantage of sales. We show that households with an annual
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income of $20,000 or less pay at least 5.9% more per sheet of toilet paper due to their inability
to utilize these strategies to the same extent as households with an annual income of $100,000
or more. Interestingly, these low income households save approximately 8.8% per sheet of
toilet paper by purchasing cheaper brands than high income households. Therefore, about
two-thirds of the savings low income households accrue through brand choice is forfeited by
their relative inability to utilize intertemporal money-saving strategies. We also show that
during the first week of the month, low income households eliminate around 30% of their
price-per-sheet deficit by buying in bulk and on sale more often.
Our results indicate that liquidity constraints hinder the responsiveness of lower income
households to bulk and temporary discounts, even for seemingly low-priced, everyday pur-
chases. Understanding households' intertemporal substitution patterns is critical to a re-
tailer's promotion planning (Silva-Risso, Bucklin, & Morrison, 1999). Therefore, our find-
ings point to a few retail recommendations. A retailer aiming to incentivize lower income
families to consolidate their purchases in its stores, for example, could schedule temporary
discounts more frequently during times of relatively higher liquidity. Additionally, they
could offer liquidity assistance to encourage buying in bulk. Our findings also have policy
implications. Policy makers should consider factors that inhibit lower income households
from making financially beneficial choices, in addition to factors that limit the accessibility
of stores (Kaufman, 1997; Chung & Myers, 1999; Talukdar, 2008) or factors that impede
the development of financial literacy (Fernandes, Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014). Public policy
aimed at decreasing the costs of poverty has been especially focused on issues of store access.
While helping improve lower income households' access to supermarkets could be beneficial
by expanding their access to money-saving opportunities, providing liquidity relief would
also help them take greater advantage of the money-saving opportunities already available
to them.
3.3 Related Literature
This paper contributes to 1) literature that documents different financial burdens shouldered
by the poor (the poverty penalty) and 2) the marketing literature on drivers of deal-
proneness. Within the poverty penalty literature, research on how income groups differ
in their ability to buy in bulk has produced conflicting results. Some have found that
the poorest households in developing (Rao, 2000; Attanasio & Frayne, 2006) and developed
nations (Frank, Douglas, & Polli, 1967) pay a higher unit price for products as a consequence
of buying in bulk less than their higher income counterparts, while more recent work using
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larger datasets from developed nations suggests the opposite (Griffith et al., 2009; Beatty,
2010). The results of these studiesand therefore the differences observed across them
may be influenced by differences in the types of stores or brands available to different income
groups, as well as systematic differences between income groups in variables that are likely to
affect package size choice, such as consumption or household type. Our empirical approach
controls for such differences, allowing us to estimate how a low income household's package
size choice would differ from that of a high income household with a similar demographic
profile and consumption rate, purchasing at the same type of store, and purchasing the same
brand. Given the wealth of literature showing that low income households have fewer store
types and products available to them (Kaufman, 1997; Chung & Myers, 1999; Talukdar,
2008), we find such controls to be essential. We document that lower income households
choose to buy smaller package sizes than higher income households, forgoing opportunities
to receive bulk discounts.
The strategic timing of purchases in response to promotions is a central topic for mar-
keters. However, to the best of our knowledge, previous researchers have not documented
differences between income groups in their ability to accelerate purchase timing to take ad-
vantage of a sale. Neslin, Henderson, and Quelch (1985) were some of the first to provide
a comprehensive study of consumers accelerating purchases in order to take advantage of
sales, and the potential for an interaction between purchase acceleration and bulk buying,
but they did not find significant differences between income groups among the sample of
2,293 consumers in their dataset. Even though larger datasets have since become available
and allowed for larger scale studies, the literature has remained silent on whether lower in-
come households are less able than higher income households to strategically time purchases
to take advantage of sales. This paper shows that lower income householdsthose likely to
be most price sensitiveare less likely to accelerate purchases in order to take advantage of
sales than are other households, and also documents a feedback loop between the inability
to accelerate purchases and the inability to buy in bulk.
The marketing literature studying differences in deal-proneness has often found that
higher income households are more likely than lower income households to utilize deals such
as coupons or temporary discounts (see Blattberg, Luesign, Peacock, & Sen, 1978; Lichten-
stein, Burton, & Netemeyer, 1997; Bawa and Shoemaker, 1987). Our paper contributes to
this literature by studying a process by which these differences may be generated. Our re-
sults suggest that the relative inability of lower income households to accelerate purchases is
one potential reason low income households may be less responsive to temporary discounts.
An additional contribution of this paper is to go beyond documenting cross-sectional
differences in these behaviors, to study a mechanism by which such differences may be
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caused. We focus on the role of liquidity constraints.1 The fact that liquidity constraints may
impact lower income household shopping behavior is intuitive, and has been hypothesized
in earlier work (Kunreuther, 1973; Griffith et al., 2009; Beatty, 2010). Despite its appeal
and importance, empirical evidence regarding the impact of liquidity constraints on the
utilization of money-saving strategies is lacking. We provide causal evidence that liquidity
constraints are at least partially responsible for inhibiting low income households from buying
in bulk and accelerating purchases to take advantage of sales. We show that the effect of
liquidity constraints on these behaviors transcends the effect of education, transportation,
and storage constraintsfactors that previous literature in marketing has shown explain
some of the differences in deal-proneness between income groups. Clearly, these additional
factors could also contribute to the behavioral differences across income groups. For example,
lower income households tend to have less storage space. Bell and Hilber (2006) show that
storage constraints inhibit the ability to buy in bulk. Lower income households also have
fewer transportation options that allow them to access stores (Talukdar, 2008), limiting
their options to buy in bulk or find sales. Additionally, low income households may have
lower financial literacy or present-biased preferences (Delaney & Doyle, 2012), which may
result in a lower propensity to engage in strategies that require intertemporal substitution
in general. While these factors may be constraining low income households, our results show
that liquidity constraints impede low income households above and beyond the impact of
these other factors.
1 We provide evidence regarding the role of liquidity constraints by comparing purchases made during the
first week of the month, when households' liquidity constraints are partially relaxed by the receipt of pay-
checks (and in some cases, food stamps), to purchases made during the rest of the month. This identification
strategy builds on the literature studying the sensitivity of total consumption to changes in liquidity: due
to the receipt of financial resources such as paychecks (Stephens, 2006; Zhang, 2013), food stamps (Beatty
& Tuttle, 2014), social security checks (Stephens, 2003), tax rebates (Johnson, Parker, & Souleles, 2004;
Parker, Souleles, Johnson, & McClelland, 2011; Misra & Surico, 2014); or due to policy changes, such as
those governing tax withholding (Shapiro & Slemrod, 1995) or credit markets (Leth-Petersen, 2010). Similar
identification strategies have been used in recent work drawing causal connections between changes in the
income or wealth of households and private label purchases (Dubé, Hitsch, & Rossi, 2015), and shopping
behaviors (Nevo & Wong, 2014).
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3.4 Data
We use the Nielsen consumer panel dataset provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing at
Chicago Booth for our analyses. This dataset contains all purchases by a household during
the period for which it was a member of the panel. For each purchase occasion, the data
provides: the retail channel shopped at; the price, quantity, and package size of each UPC
purchased; an indicator for whether each UPC purchased was on sale; and the purchase
date.2 We also observe a yearly survey of each household's demographics.
The data allows us to sort households into five annual household income groups that
closely mirror income quintiles in the U.S.: (Income Group 1) Less than $20,000, (Income
Group 2) $20,000 to $40,000, (Income Group 3) $40,000 to $60,000, (Income Group 4)
$60,000 to $100,000, and (Income Group 5) greater than $100,000.3 As Table 3.1 shows,
the panel dataset provides fairly good coverage of each income group, although it slightly
over-represents the middle income groups. For simplicity, we refer to income group 1 as low
income households and income group 5 as high income households going forward. We use
higher income households to designate all households except low income households.
In total, the panel dataset contains more than 110,000 households that purchased in the
toilet paper category. These households made a total of 2.8 million purchases from 2006 to
2012 in this category, with the average household purchase pattern indicating a consumption
rate of slightly more than two rolls of toilet paper per week. The most commonly purchased
sizes are 1-, 4-, 6-, 9-, 12-, 24-, 30-, and 36- roll packages, which account for 92% of purchases.
Products from the top five brands (Angel-Soft, Charmin, Kleenex, Quilted Northern and
Scott) account for 74% of purchases, and private labels account for another 19%. The most
commonly visited channels for toilet paper purchases were grocery stores (47.5%), discount
stores (28.9%), warehouse stores (7.6%), drug stores (6.5%), and dollar stores (5.7%).
The toilet paper category is particularly suitable to studying differences in households'
purchase strategies for non-perishable products, in part because bulk and temporary dis-
counts are common. Table 3.2 shows just how common temporary discounts are. On aver-
age, 34% of purchases featured a temporary discount, though the frequency of temporary
discounts varies greatly across sizes and brands. To illustrate the depth of bulk discounts in
this category, Table 3.3 provides the average price-per-standardized roll (341.8 sheets) for six
major products at three different sizes. The standardization of rolls helps us more accurately
compare different products. The potential for savings by buying in bulk is substantial. For
2Package size must be constructed from multiple variablessee Appendix 3.1 for details.
3Actual quintiles, per http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Household_income_in_the_United_States, were
$0-$25K, $25-$45K, $45-65K, $65-105K, and $105K + in 2011. The income buckets used by Nielsen, though
fairly granular, do not allow for groupings that perfectly match these quintiles.
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example, a standardized roll of Charmin Ultra-Soft costs 26.7% less if it comes from a 12-roll
package than if it comes from a 4-roll package. Table 3.4 provides the sales-weighted average
bulk discount provided by different package sizes across all products in a channel during a
given quarter, compared to the 4-roll base size. Within a channel and quarter, the average
12-roll package offers a 19.8% discount per standardized roll compared to a 4-roll package of
the same product, and the average 36-roll UPC offers a 44.3% discount.
These summary statistics indicate that both temporary and bulk discounts are highly
prevalent in this product category. The raw data summarized in Table 3.5 reveals stark
differences across income groups in the propensity to utilize these discounts. The households
in the lowest income group (INC1) buy on sale less often and purchase smaller sizes than
higher income households. The highest income group (INC5) purchases items on sale 38.9%
of the time, while the lowest income group purchases items on sale only 28.3% of the time.
The highest income group also buys UPCs that contain 4.8 more rolls and 1,558 more sheets,
on average, than those purchased by the lowest income group. Importantly, however, low
income households are not forgoing every opportunity to save. They are more likely to
purchase the cheapest product available when buying a given package size.
These data patterns are consistent with the notion that low income households may have
trouble utilizing intertemporal money-saving strategies, but could also be driven by a lack of
access to the types of stores or brands that more readily offer bulk and temporary discounts
(e.g. supermarkets and national brands). They could also be due to low income households
purchasing cheaper brands (e.g., private labels), if those brands are less likely to be offered
in larger sizes or on sale. Consistent with past research, the raw data shows that low income
households are less likely to purchase at grocery and warehouse stores than higher income
households and are more likely to purchase at drug and dollar stores (Table 3.6). UPCs sold
at drug and dollar stores are considerably smaller than those sold at warehouse and grocery
stores, indicating that the package sizes available at each differ. Additionally, the brands
purchased at a greater relative frequency by low income households tend to have lower prices,
but are purchased on sale less frequently (Table 3.7). Our analyses, therefore, control for
the store types low income households visit and the brands they buy.
The observed differences between purchases made by low and high income groups could
also be driven by factors that systematically differ across income groups, such as consump-
tion rates and demographics. A household's consumption rate is particularly important to
account for, as households that consume toilet paper faster are incentivized to carry larger
inventories and may consequently be incentivized to buy in bulk or stockpile in response to
sales to a greater degree. The data in Table 3.8 shows that low income households have
different demographic profiles than higher income households. For example, they tend to
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have fewer occupants and lower levels of education. They also have lower average levels of
daily consumption than higher income households (Table 3.9), though this is in large part
driven by the greater proportion of single-person households at lower income levels. Our
analyses control for differences across income groups in demographics and consumption, to
ensure that inferences are drawn between households with similar levels of consumption and
demographic profiles.
Einav, Leibtag, and Nevo (2010) note the importance of taking into account potential
recording discrepancies in this dataset. Such discrepancies are apparent in the raw data
(e.g., package sizes reported to contain 1,296 rolls of toilet paper). Another issue is that a
few households do not seem to be reporting all of their purchases (e.g., for some households,
several years elapse between reported toilet paper purchases). For these reasons, we make a
(conservative) effort to clean the data, correcting or removing entries that suffer from severe
discrepancies. We retain 97.4% of observations for our analyses, and our conclusions are not
sensitive to the removed entries. Our cleaning approach may be useful to other researchers
using this dataset, so a detailed description is provided in Appendix 3.2. The key results of
our analyses using the full dataset can also be found in Appendix 3.2.
3.5 Differences in Purchase Decisions
In this section, we document differences in the propensity of households from different income
groups to buy in bulk (Section 3.5.1) and to accelerate purchases in order to buy on sale
(Section 3.5.2). We are investigating the purchase behavior of low income households within
their typical shopping context, and therefore control for differences across income groups in
households' access to different types of stores and brands, as well as brand preferences. In
effect, we are comparing how likely a low income household is, relative to a higher income
household, to engage in these intertemporal money-saving strategies when shopping at a
given type of store (e.g. grocery store) and buying a given brand.
Additionally, in Section 3.5.3, we demonstrate a compounding relationship between these
two intertemporal money-saving strategies. We show that an inability to utilize one impairs
a household's ability to utilize the other.
3.5.1 Buying in Bulk
To determine whether low income households are less likely to utilize bulk buying as a
money-saving strategy, we compare the package sizes purchased by different income groups
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while controlling for the types of products and stores they have access to. We regress the
package size of product p purchased by household h during shopping trip t (Shtp) on income
group indicator variables (I[INC = i]) and several sets of controls.
Shtp = α +
5∑
i=2
βiI[INC = i] + η1[Consumption]h + η2[Demographics]ht
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + htp (3.1)
The error term htp is assumed to independent across households but may be correlated
within households. We therefore run statistical tests using cluster-robust standard errors,
clustered by household (both here and for subsequent analyses).
The income group variable I[INC = i] is equal to one if household h is a member of
income group i during the year of purchase, where i = 1 corresponds to households with
income less than $20K, i = 2 to $20K - $40K, i = 3 to $40K - $60K, i = 4 to $60K - $100K,
and i = 5 to greater than $100K.
Product controls ([Product]p) are fixed effects for the 97 products in the Nielsen dataset.
4
These control for the possibility that the products low income households have access to, or
purchase most frequently (e.g., private labels, which are cheaper than national brands), may
be more readily available in smaller sizes than those products purchased most frequently by
higher income households. Similarly, channel controls ([Channel]t) are fixed effects for each
of the 66 channels in the Nielsen dataset and control for the possibility that low income
households may have greater access to store types that carry smaller package sizes (e.g.,
dollar stores) than those that carry bulk sizes (e.g., warehouse stores).
Additionally, we control for consumption differences across income groups by including
a third-order polynomial of a household's average daily consumption ([Consumption]h) in
our regression, which allows us to flexibly control for both linear and non-linear relation-
ships between a household's consumption rate and the package sizes it purchases. Appendix
3.1 provides details for how this daily consumption rate is calculated. We also control for
the annual demographic profiles of households ([Demographics]ht), which also systemati-
cally vary across income groups, using dummy variables for its components: the categorical
demographic variables previously described in Section 3.4 (e.g. household size, education).
Lastly, we include time controls ([Time]t) to control for seasonality and changes in the avail-
4We can identify 11 major products within our dataset, which account for 72.4% of purchases. From the
remaining 27.6% of purchases, we construct an additional 86 conglomerate products, each of which consists
of multiple, very small-share products for a given brand. The agglomeration is necessary when the data on
attributes do not help distinguish between versions of products represented by different UPCs.
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ability of different package sizes over time: month fixed effects for each four-week block
between 2006 and 2012, and a weekend indicator variable.
Table 3.10 provides the parameter estimates from regression 3.1 (in the final column,
3.1D). We find that low income households purchase UPCs with fewer sheets of toilet
paper than higher income households, even after controlling for differences in consumption
rates, demographics, time of purchase, brand purchased, and type of store visited. Low in-
come households (income < $20K) purchase toilet paper UPCs containing 391.6 fewer sheets
(1.14 fewer standardized rolls), on average, than those purchased by high income households
(income > $100K) with similar demographics and consumption levels. Consequently, the
average low income household makes 1.9 more purchase trips per year than the average high
income household purchasing the same annual volume of toilet paper. Given the prevalence
of bulk discounts in this category, low income households may be foregoing considerable
savings by buying smaller package sizes.
Table 3.10 also provides the parameter estimates for versions of regression 3.1 that contain
only a subset of our controls. This allows us to compare the degree to which various controls,
and the assumptions that correspond to those controls, affect our estimates. Channel controls
absorb differences between the average size purchased by low and high income households
due to differences in the frequency with which each income group shops at various channels.
As expected, the magnitude of the parameter estimates from the full regression (3.1D) is
smaller than that from the regression that does not use channel controls (3.1C). This result
suggests that accessibility of channels may play an important role in determining package size
choice. Income difference estimates further increase when we remove product controls (3.1B),
suggesting that the types of products low income households purchase are mostly purchased
(and perhaps mostly available) in smaller package sizes. These results are consistent with
the notion that issues of accessibility to channels that carry, and products that offer, larger
package sizes may be a limiting factor for low income households. However, some of the
attenuation of the income differences due to the inclusion of channel or product controls
may be due to low income households choosing not to purchase at channels that carry larger
UPCs, or not to purchase products that are available in larger package sizes. For example, a
low income household may choose not to visit a warehouse store if it knows it cannot afford
the 36-roll UPCs primarily sold there. To the extent that this is the case, the estimates in
regression 3.1D can be thought of as conservative estimates of the impact of income on size
choice.
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3.5.2 Accelerating Purchase to Buy on Sale
Households that were not planning to purchase during trip t may be encouraged to do
so if they observe a sale at the store they are visiting (Neslin, et al., 1985). If low income
households have difficulty engaging in intertemporal substitution, they will naturally be less
able to accelerate their purchase to take advantage of such opportunities. We test to see
whether this is the case.
Hendel and Nevo (2006b) show that if a household is stockpiling for future consumption
by accelerating its next purchase incidence to buy on sale, a researcher should observe two
model-free patterns in the data: 1) that the interpurchase time preceding sale purchases
should be shorter than the interpurchase time preceding non-sale purchases, which provides
evidence that households are buying earlier than they otherwise would have; and 2) that
the interpurchase time following sale purchases should be longer than the interpurchase
time following non-sale purchases, which provides evidence that households are not merely
buying earlier to consume more, but are storing for future consumption. By contrast, if
household purchase timing is not influenced by the presence of a sale, then interpurchase
times preceding sale and non-sale purchases should not differ.
If low income households are less likely to accelerate purchases than higher income house-
holds, then the difference between low income households' sale and non-sale interpurchase
times should be less pronounced than the difference for higher income households. We test
this hypothesis using a difference-in-differences regression, in line with Hendel and Nevo
(2006b). For each product p purchased by household h during shopping trip t, we regress
the time in days since the previous purchase, IPThtp, on household fixed effects (αh), a binary
variable indicating whether the purchased UPC was on sale (I[sale]htp), income group inter-
actions with the sale variable, and our previously established controls (except consumption
controls, which are redundant when household fixed effects are included).
IPThtp = αh + δ0I[sale]htp +
5∑
i=2
δiI[INC = i]I[sale]htp
+ η2[Demographics]ht + η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + htp (3.2)
The parameter δ0 measures the degree to which interpurchase times preceding sale pur-
chases differ from those preceding non-sale purchases for households in the lowest income
group. The parameters δi(i ≥ 2) measure the degree to which households from higher income
groups differ from the lowest income group on this measure.
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We provide the results in Table 3.11. The estimate of δ0 is negative, suggesting that the
length of time between a sale purchase and a household's previous purchase is shorter than
the length of time between a non-sale purchase and a household's previous purchase. In
other words, low income households (income < $20,000) accelerate their purchase timing in
response to sales. We find that δi is also negative for i≥4. This finding suggests that higher
income households accelerate their purchase timing in response to sales even more than low
income households do. More specifically, we find that low income households accelerate
their purchase by 0.94 days on average when buying a UPC that is on salea 2.4% decrease
in interpurchase time from that income group's average, non-sale interpurchase time (38.8
days; Table 3.5). High income households (income > $100,000) respond most aggressively,
accelerating purchase by 1.62 daysa 72% increase over the number of days the lowest
income group accelerated byand a 3.3% decrease relative to the highest income group's
average non-sale interpurchase time (48.4 days).
To check whether this difference in purchase timing is due, at least in part, to purchase
acceleration, rather than an increase in consumption, we test whether the time until the next
purchase occasion (Durationhtp) increases in response to purchasing on sale.
Durationhtp = αh + δ0I[sale]htp +
5∑
i=2
δiI[INC = i]I[sale]htp
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + htp (3.3)
Consistent with stockpiling behavior, the results in Table 3.12 illustrate that households
waited longer before purchasing again following sale purchases than they did following non-
sale purchases (δ0 > 0). Interestingly, this difference is greatest for low income households
(δi < 0 for i > 2), even though higher income households display greater purchase accelera-
tion. We will explore why this may be the case in Section ??.
Low income households' relative inability to accelerate purchase timing to buy on sale
implies that they should purchase on sale less often than high income households. Consistent
with Hendel and Nevo (2006b), we test this conjecture by modeling the probability that
product p purchased by household h at time t was made on sale using a linear probability
model. We regress the sale variable I[sale]htp on income group variables and the full set of
controls. We also introduce a new set of controls herepackage size controls ([Size]p). The
frequency with which sales are offered may vary not only by channel and product, but also
by package size. The data in Table 3.2 indicates that some package sizes may be offered
on sale more frequently than others. Consequently, we include dummy variables for each
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package size in the data (in terms of rolls), as well as a third-order polynomial of the number
of sheets each roll in the purchased product p contained.
I[sale]htp = α +
5∑
i=2
βiI[INC = i] + η1[Consumption]h + η2[Demographics]ht
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + η6[Size]p + htp (3.4)
The results presented in Table 3.13 suggest that low income households do not buy on
sale as often as higher income households, even when they are purchasing the same product,
of the same size, and in the same channel as higher income households. More specifically,
a purchase by a low income household is 2.3% less likely to take advantage of a temporary
discount than a purchase by a high income household. This 2.3% deficit is a sizable one,
given that only 28.3% of low income household purchases are made on sale. Low income
households appear to be foregoing the cost savings associated with temporary discounts with
non-trivial frequency, even though they are generally more incentivized to save money. This
result is consistent with the notion that an inability to strategically time their purchases
inhibits the ability of low income households to buy on sale.
3.5.3 Compounding Relationship
A household's ability to buy in bulk has the potential to indirectly affect its ability to
buy on sale, and vice-versa. For example, the purchase of a large UPC provides a bigger
boost to inventory than the purchase of a small one. This provides a household with more
time until they run out of inventory and must purchase again, increasing the likelihood that
they will encounter a sale and be able to take advantage of it. Thus, buying in bulk may
help a household strategically time its purchases to take advantage of sales. Similarly, sales
on large UPCs make them more affordable and may put them within reach of households
that would not be able to afford them at their regular price. Consequently, the ability to
accelerate purchase timing to buy on sale helps facilitate buying bulk items. In this section,
we test for evidence of this compounding relationship between buying in bulk and on sale.
We first examine whether buying in bulk helps households wait for sales. We test whether
(a) low income households have lower inventories, on average, and (b) whether sale purchases
are likely to be made at higher inventory levels, since purchases at low inventory levels are
more likely to be induced by necessity than purchases made at higher inventory levels. If
both tests are successful, this would provide support for the hypothesis that low income
households are less able to wait for sales because they carry lower inventory levels.
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Next, we examine whether buying on sale allows low income households to purchase
larger package sizes. We test to see if low income households are disproportionately likely
to increase their package size purchased when buying on sale. A successful test of this
hypothesis would imply that low income households' relative inability to accelerate purchase
timing to take advantage of sales also inhibits their ability to buy in bulk.
To investigate whether lower levels of inventory make it more difficult for low income
households to wait for sales, we test whether (a) low income households have lower levels of
inventory than higher income households, and (b) purchases made on sale are more likely to
be made at higher inventory levels.
To test (a), we regress household h's average daily inventory on income dummy variables
and consumption controls.5 Because inventory is unobserved, we construct a household
inventory variable in a manner consistent with past research (e.g. Neslin et al., 1985; see
Appendix 3.1 for details).
AV GINVh = α +
5∑
i=2
βiI[INC = i] + η1[Consumption]h + h (3.5)
To test (b), we use a linear probability model, regressing I[sale]htp on household h's
inventory level (in sheets of toilet paper) at the time of purchase (INVhtp), household fixed
effects (αh), time controls, and controls for product, channel, and package size:
I[sale]htp = αh + ρINVhp + η2[Demographics]ht
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + η6[Size]p + htp (3.6)
The results are presented in Table 3.14.6 We find that low income households have 814
fewer sheets of toilet paper (2.4 fewer standardized rolls) in inventory than the highest income
households, on average. Additionally, a household's probability of buying on sale is found to
be increasing in their inventory at the time of purchase, consistent with the hypothesis that
a purchase made at low inventory levels is more likely induced by the prospect of running
5For this regression, we exclude households that switched income groups during their time in the panel,
because the dependent variable is household specific and the regression is thus cross-sectional. Using all
households and assigning the first income group of the household for the entire time in the panel as an
alternative specification produces results consistent with those presented here.
6As a robustness check, we also run variants of regression 3.6 on observable proxies for inventory, the
results of which are consistent with the results presented here and can be found in Appendix 3.3.
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out of inventory, and less likely to be strategically timed. Together, these results imply that
low income households are less able to wait for a sale than higher income households.
We next use a difference-in-differences regression to test whether buying on sale helps low
income households purchase bulk items. If, as hypothesized, sales on larger package sizes can
make previously unaffordable sizes affordable to low income households, then (1) low income
households' sale purchases should be larger than non-sale purchases, and (2) this difference
should be greater than the corresponding difference between a higher income households'
sale and non-sale purchases.
We regress the package size of product p purchased by household h during trip t (Shtp)
on household fixed effects (αh), the sale variable (I[sale]htp), income group interactions with
the sale variable, and our previously defined controls. The parameter δ0 measures the degree
to which households from the lowest income group increase the size of a product purchased
when buying on sale (versus not). The parameters δi (i ≥ 2) measure the degree to which
households from other income groups differ from the lowest income group on this dimension.
Shtp = αh + δ0I[sale]htp +
5∑
i=2
δiI[INC = i]I[sale]htp
+ η2[Demographics]ht + η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + htp (3.7)
Table 3.15 summarizes the results. Low income households purchase UPCs containing
420 additional sheets (1.2 standardized rolls) of toilet paper when buying on sale than when
not. This increase is 172.5 sheets greater than the increase seen by higher income households.
All households tend to increase the amount of toilet paper that they buy in response to sale,
but sales allow low income households to partially catch up to higher income households.
This is consistent with the notion that low income households are cash constrained, as a sale
on a large item might make it temporarily affordable to a cash constrained household that
would otherwise be unable to afford it. Recall that, overall, low income households purchase
UPCs that contain 391.6 fewer sheets than those purchased by higher income households, on
average (Table 3.10). When buying on sale, low income households make up ground, erasing
nearly half of this deficit by increasing their average package size purchased by 172.5 more
sheets than the highest income households do.7
7In Appendix 3.4, we also investigate whether low income households are more or less likely than high
income households to stockpile by purchasing multiple copies of a UPC (quantity), and whether low or high
income households purchase greater total volume (package size × quantity). The results for both quantity
and volume are consistent with the results presented here for package sizelow income households do more
stockpiling, conditional on being able to buy on sale in the first place.
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3.6 Liquidity Constraints
Having established that low income households purchase smaller package sizes and accel-
erate purchase timing in response to sales to a lesser degree than higher income households,
and that these two behaviors have a compounding nature, we next investigate whether liq-
uidity constraints play a role in driving this differential. To do this, we utilize the partial
relaxation of liquidity constraints provided by the arrival of paychecks and food stamps, in
line with Stephens (2006) and Zhang (2013). Since we do not observe the actual timing
of paycheck arrival for households in our data, we compare purchases during the first week
of the month to purchases during other weeks. Both the semi-monthly and monthly pay-
check schedules pay employees on the last day of the month. Therefore, a majority of the
households get an influx of cash at the beginning of the month. A small fraction of these
households also may be receiving food stamps during that time.
Low income households should benefit from this temporary boost in liquidity to a greater
degree than higher income households, which may not benefit at all. We therefore hypoth-
esize that during the first week of the month, compared to the rest of the month, (a) low
income households will purchase larger package sizes, (b) accelerate purchase timing in re-
sponse to sales by a greater number of days, and (c) buy on sale more frequently, as a
consequence of (b). By contrast, the purchase behavior of higher income households may
not differ between the first week of the month and the other weeks (if they are uncon-
strained), or their behavior may change to a lesser degree than low income households (if
they are merely less constrained than low income households).
Our objective here is to determine whether the data support a causal link between liquid-
ity and the ability of low income households to utilize intertemporal money-saving strategies.
However, the magnitude of our findings should be interpreted as lower bounds, as (a) the
receipt of paychecks and food stamps only partially relax a household's liquidity constraints,
and (b) we do not observe the exact date on which paychecks or food stamps are received,
so the measure of this partial relaxation is very noisy.
Importantly, a household's living arrangements, transportation options, and ability to
plan for future consumption, as well as the location of nearby stores and the products sold
there, are presumably time invariant.8 Thus, the findings in this section cannot be the
result of differences across income groups in access to different types of stores or products
(e.g. large sizes), storage costs, transportation options, or myopic decision making. This
8Even if the availability of bulk or temporary discounts differs systematically by the week of the month,
the difference-in-differences approach measures the difference between the change observed for low income
groups and the change observed for other income groups while controlling for common trends that vary
across time and store types.
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rules out several alternate hypotheses as the sole drivers of the purchase behavior witnessed,
though past research does suggest that these factors may be acting in concert with liquidity
constraints.
3.6.1 Bulk Discounts
We first test whether purchases during the first week of the month tend to be larger
than during other times of the month using a difference-in-differences regression. We regress
the package size of product p purchased by household h during shopping trip t (Shtp) on
(i) household fixed effects, (ii) a variable indicating whether the purchase was made during
the first seven days of the month (I[Week1]ht), (iii) interactions between the first week
variable and income group variables, and (iv) the previously defined controls.
Shtp = αh + ψ0I[Week1]ht +
5∑
i=2
ψiI[INC = i]I[Week1]ht
+ η2[Demographics]ht + η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + htp (3.8)
As hypothesized, we find that low income households purchase larger package sizes during
the first week of the month (ψ0 > 0 ), and to a greater degree than higher income households
(ψi < 0). Specifically, the lowest income households purchase UPCs containing 60.0 more
sheets during the first week of the month than those purchased during the rest of the month
(ψ0; Table 3.16), and this gain is 42.5 sheets greater than the gain for high income households
(ψ5). Recall that the analyses in section 3.5.1 found that the lowest income households
purchase UPCs containing 391.6 fewer sheets than the highest income households. A gain
of 42.5 sheets relative to the highest income households represents a 10.8% reduction of this
deficit.
Note that Table 3.16 indicates that, as with previous results, the inclusion of channel
controls diminishes the estimated differences between low income households and higher
income households. As mentioned previously, channel controls are intended to control for
differences in access that income groups may have to different types of stores. However, these
controls may lead us to underestimate the magnitude of our results if low income households
are choosing not to purchase at stores that offer bulk discounts because they know they
cannot afford the larger packages available there. Interestingly, during the first week of the
month, low income households are more likely to purchase at discount stores than during the
rest of the month.9 Discount stores offer larger package sizes than most channels. This lends
9Additional details can be found in Appendix 3.5.
55
credence to the notion that the results presented in this paper are conservative in nature,
as low income households are choosing to shop at channels with larger package sizes during
times of higher liquidity.
3.6.2 Temporary Discounts
We next investigate whether the liquidity boost received during the first week of the
month allows low income households to accelerate purchase in response to sale to a greater
degree than during the rest of the month, and, consistent with this, purchase on sale more
frequently.
The previously defined interpurchase time variable IPThtp (time, in days, since the previ-
ous shopping trip) is regressed on several sets of variables. The first set includes (i) household
fixed effects, (ii) a variable indicating whether the UPC purchased was on sale (I[sale]htp),
and (iii) income group interactions with the sale variable. These variables will capture
the baseline behavior of households outside of the first week of the month. Also included
are (iv) a variable indicating whether purchase p was made during the first seven days
of the month (I[Week1]htp), (v) an interaction between the sale and first week variables
(I[sale]htpI[Week1]htp), and (vi) income group interactions the first week and sale × first
week variables. The first week variable and the income interactions with it measure the
degree to which interpurchase time changes for a household during the first week of the month
for non-sale purchases. The sale × first week interaction, and the further interactions with
income, measure whether the response of interpurchase time to the relaxation of liquidity
that occurs in the first week of the month differs between sale and non-sale purchases. Lastly,
we include (vii) the previously defined time, product, and channel controls.
IPThtp = αh + δ0I[sale]htp +
5∑
i=2
δiI[INC = i]I[sale]htp
+ ψ0I[Week1]htp +
5∑
i=2
ψiI[INC = i]I[Week1]htp
+ γ0I[sale]htpI[Week1]htp +
5∑
i=2
γiI[INC = i]I[sale]htpI[Week1]htp
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + htp (3.9)
Our previous results suggest that low income households accelerate purchases in response
to sales to a lesser degree than higher income households (δ0 < 0). This should be most
true outside of the first week, when low income households have less liquidity (δi > 0 for
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i ≥ 2). We hypothesize that low income households will accelerate purchase in response to
sale to a greater degree during the first week of the month than at other times (γ0 < 0),
and that this difference will be greater than the increase in acceleration (if there is one) for
higher income households (γi > 0 for i ≥ 2). Lastly, there is no reason to hypothesize a
change in the interpurchase time for non-sale purchases during the first week of the month
(ψ0 and ψi should be n/s). The results in Table 3.17 largely support these hypotheses. Low
income households accelerate their purchases in response to sale by an additional 0.8 days
during the first week of the month (γ0 = −0.8). By contrast, the highest income households
do not accelerate more during the first week of the month. Outside of the first week of the
month, low income households accelerate in response to sale by 0.74 days (δ0), while the
highest income group accelerates by 1.64 days (δ0 + δ5). However, during the first week
of the month, low income households erase this deficit entirelyaccelerating by 1.54 days
(δ0 + γ0) to the highest income group's 1.48 days (δ0 + δ5 + γ0 + γ5).
Given these results, it stands to reason that low income households may consequently
be able to take advantage of temporary discounts more often during the first week of the
month. To test whether they do, we regress the sale variable I[sale]htp on household fixed
effects, the first week variable (I[Week1]hp), interactions between the first week variable and
income group variables, and our controls.
I[sale]htp = αh + ψ0I[Week1]htp +
5∑
i=2
ψiI[INC = i]I[Week1]htp
+ η2[Demographics]ht + η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + η6[Size]p + htp
(3.10)
The results (Table 3.18) support the hypothesis that low income households will purchase
on sale more frequently during the first week of the month (ψ0 > 0) and to a greater degree
than higher income households (ψi < 0 for i ≥ 4). The lowest income households purchase
on sale an additional 0.36% of the time during the first week of the month, and the gap
between these households and the highest income households shrinks by 0.49%. This erases
roughly 20% of their deficit relative to the highest income households, which were found to
purchase on sale 2.3% more frequently than the lowest income households in section 3.5.2
(Table 3.13).
3.7 Potential Financial Impact
In this section we run back-of-the-envelope calculations to gauge the financial impact of
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low income households' relative inability to buy in bulk and on sale. We calculate three
values: (1) how much more low income households pay by buying in bulk and on sale less
than high income households (their foregone intertemporal savings), (2) how much less
low income households pay by buying cheaper brands than high income households (brand
choice savings), and (3) how much less low income households pay during the first week of
the month compared to the rest of the month, due to buying in bulk and on sale more often
during this period (pay period savings).
The foregone intertemporal savings calculation compares the purchases of low income
households to those of high income households. Because low income households are more
incentivized to utilize intertemporal money saving strategies than higher income households,
we would actually expect unconstrained low income households to utilize these money-saving
strategies more frequently than high income households, rather than at the same frequency
(all else equal). Consequently, the foregone intertemporal savings calculation provides a
lower-bound value for how much money low income households are leaving on the table
due to their relative inability to utilize these strategies. Comparing low income households'
foregone intertemporal savings to their brand choice savings gives us a sense of the relative
importance of buying in bulk and on sale as money-saving exercises in the toilet paper
category.
Lastly, comparing low income households' foregone intertemporal savings to their pay
period savings helps us gauge how much of low income households' foregone intertemporal
savings can be attributed to liquidity constraints, rather than other factors such as storage
constraints. The calculated pay period savings provides a lower-bound value for how much
money low income households can save if they were unconstrained, as liquidity constraints
are only partially relaxed during the first week of the month.
3.7.1 Calculation Methodology
If we wish to calculate how much low income households are leaving on the table by not
buying in bulk and on sale as often as high income households, what we really wish to know
is this: How much would low income households (i = 1) have saved had they purchased
package sizes (in rolls) r and bought on sale at the frequency that high income households
(i = 5) did, while holding the low income households' choice of product, channel visited,
and time of purchase constant? To answer this question, we calculate 1) the frequency with
which low income households purchase product j from channel c during quarter q (pijcq|i=1),
2) the frequency with which low income households purchased a UPC containing r rolls on
sale (s = 1) and not (s = 0), conditional on a product, channel, and quarter (pirs|jcq,i=1),
3) the frequency with which high income households purchased a UPC containing r rolls
on sale and not, conditional on a product, channel, and quarter (pirs|qcj,i=5), 4) the average
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price paid by low income households for each product, in each channel, during each quarter,
given sale status and package size (Pjcqrs|i=1), and 5) the average number of standardized
rolls contained within UPCs for a given product, containing a given number of rolls, in each
channel, during each quarter (Rjcqr). Using these five values, we can calculate (a) the average
price low income households paid per standardized roll, and (b) the average price they would
have paid per standardized roll had they purchased larger sizes and sale items at the same
relative frequencies as higher income households (pirs|qcj,i=5). The foregone intertemporal
savings per sheet of toilet paper is given by the difference between (a) and (b):
Foregone intertemporal savings
=
∑
q,c,j pijcq|i=1
∑
r,s pirs|jcq,i=1(Pjcqrs|i=1)∑
q,c,j pijcq|i=1
∑
r,s pirs|jcq,i=1(Rjcqr)
−
∑
q,c,j pijcq|i=1
∑
r,s pirs|jcq,i=5(Pjcqrs|i=1)∑
q,c,j pijcq|i=1
∑
r,s pirs|jcq,i=5(Rjcqr)
(3.11)
Recall that the lowest income group (i = 1) and the highest (i = 5) differ in their
consumption levels, in large part because low income households are more likely to have
only a single occupant. It is important to control for these differences when estimating
foregone bulk discounts and saved brand premiums. Consequently, we do not lump all
households together when calculating equation 3.11. Instead, we calculate it twice, using
two different sets of households: once using those households that always contained a single
member and never switched income groups and once using households that always contained
more than one member and never switched income groups. Low and high income households
within each of these sets have similar consumption rates (see Table 3.9 in Section 3.4). We
then calculate a weighted average of these two results, where the weight applied to each
calculation is the number of low income households in the set used for the calculation.
A similar approach is used to calculate brand choice savings and pay period savings,
except that for the former we compare the brand choice frequencies of low and high income
households instead of package size frequencies, and for the latter we use the data only on
low income households, and compare their purchases during the first week of the month to
those during the rest of the month.
3.7.2 Results
We find that the average low income household saves $0.047 per standardized roll by
purchasing cheaper products than high income households. On the other hand, the average
low income household could save an additional $0.030 per standardized roll by buying in bulk
and on sale at the same frequency as higher income households. These forgone intertemporal
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savings lead them to pay 6% more per standardized roll, and account for two-thirds of the
$0.047 savings households accrue by purchasing cheaper products. However, we do find
that increased liquidity helps low income households better take advantage of intertemporal
savings. When buying during the first week of the month, the average low income household
saves $0.009 per standardized roll, making up roughly 30% of their foregone intertemporal
savings.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides (a) a thorough documentation of the ways in which income groups
differ in their ability to utilize intertemporal money-saving strategies, (b) causal evidence
that the presence of liquidity constraints impedes low income households from utilizing these
strategies, and (c) an examination of the financial losses imposed on low income households
by liquidity constraints' inhibition of these strategies.
We study money-saving purchase behaviors in the toilet paper category. Our focus on this
category is motivated by several factors: 1) bulk and temporary discounts are both common
in the category, 2) the product is not perishable, 3) consumption is relatively steady, 4)
substitution to or from other categories is unlikely, and 5) product differentiation can be
accounted for with a few product dimensions. For these reasons, bulk buying and purchase
acceleration reflect a household's intertemporal substitution behavior in the toilet paper
category more directly than in most others. Future research can devise methods to analyze
purchase behavior in categories that feature a more complex set of product attributes.
We first document that low income households purchase smaller package sizes and are
less able to accelerate their purchase timing in order to take advantage of a sale. Worse,
low income households' inability to take full advantage of bulk and temporary discounts
has a compounding nature. Because low income households buy smaller package sizes, they
carry lower inventories and have more difficulty waiting for sales. Additionally, because
low income households have difficulty accelerating their purchase timing to take advantage
of sales, they are further prevented from buying in bulk, as larger package sizes are made
more affordable when on sale. As a consequence, low income households leave money on
the table. The average standardized roll of toilet paper in our dataset costs low income
households about 50 cents, but we find that low income households pay an additional 3.0
cents per standardized roll than they would if they bought in bulk and on sale as often as
high income households. By contrast, low income households save 4.7 cents per standardized
roll by purchasing cheaper brands than high income households. Low income households'
limited ability to utilize intertemporal savings strategies, then, is forcing them to forfeit
approximately two-thirds of the savings they accrue by purchasing cheaper brands.
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We show that the infrequency with which low income households utilize these strategies
is at least partially explained by liquidity constraints. Liquidity constraints has often been
cited alongside storage constraints as a factor that might inhibit the ability of low income
households to buy everyday products in bulk (e.g., Kunreuther, 1973; Griffith et al., 2009;
Beatty, 2010). While strong empirical support has been provided for the role storage con-
straints plays in shaping intertemporal purchase behavior for everyday items (Bell & Hilber,
2006), the literature has been mostly silent regarding the role of liquidity constraints. Our
results show that during the first week of the monthwhen households receive a temporary
boost to liquidity from pay checks and food stampslow income households (a) purchase
larger package sizes and (b) accelerate their purchases in response to sale to a greater degree
than they do during the rest of the month. Moreover, these improvements are greater than
those seen for high income households during the first week of the month, as would be ex-
pected, given that higher income household are less constrained. By buying in bulk and on
sale more often during the first week of the month, low income households make up 29.5%
of their 3.0 cent deficit per standardized roll.
Our results should be interpreted as a lower-bound for the financial impact of liquidity
constraints on low income households, because our measures related to liquidity are noisy.
This noise stems from three sources. First, the data does not provide a household's annual
incomeonly an income group to which it belongs. Second, income is only one component
of liquidity. More precise measures of income and wealth, as well as measures that explicitly
take into account cost of living differences across cities and states, could potentially provide
greater insight into the behaviors being studied. Third, we do not observe the exact timing
of each household's receipt of paychecks and/or food stamps. While our measures related
to liquidity allow us to provide evidence of a causal effect of liquidity constraints on the
behaviors studied, the noisiness of the measures, coupled with the fact that paychecks and
food stamps only partially relieve liquidity constraints, impairs our ability to identify precise
magnitudes. Thus, we caution the reader that our results are likely to be biased towards a
null effect. Even though they may be biased downwards, the reported results are sizeable
and highlight how liquidity constraints influence shopping behavior in everyday product
categories. Future research that uses a more precise measure of liquidity, or explicit budgets
for shopping trips (as in Stilley, Inman, & Wakefield, 2010), can improve the precision of
these results, and go further in modeling the relationship between liquidity relaxation and a
household's ability to utilize intertemporal money-saving strategies.
Our work contributes to an important debate regarding the financial decisions low income
households make. Carvalho, Meier, & Wang (2014) note that, The debate about the reasons
underlying [differences in financial decision making behavior across income groups] has a long
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and contentious history in the social sciences; the two opposing views are that either the
poor rationally adapt and make optimal decisions for their economic environment or that
a `culture of poverty' shapes their preferences and makes them more prone to mistakes.
In support of the latter view, researchers have suggested that the attentional demands of
poverty reduce the cognitive capacity of the poor (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao,
2013), and that low income households may be more myopic or present-biased (Delaney &
Doyle, 2012; Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011). The fact that low income
households behave more like higher income households when their liquidity constraints are
relaxed provides support for the former view.
The results presented in this paper demonstrate that liquidity constraints shape purchase
behavior even for seemingly low-priced product categories. While this is discouraging from
a social welfare point of view, these results highlight valuable implications for retailers that
serve low income households. Our results imply that these retailers should be scheduling
temporary discounts more frequently during times of higher liquidity in order to increase the
sales lift. The results also suggest that retailers could potentially increase the responsiveness
of households to price promotions and bulk discounts by offering them liquidity assistance.
Though some financing programs have been offered by retailers in the past, these programs
are typically targeted at households looking to make large purchases (e.g., TVs), but not the
everyday purchases that make up such a large share of low income households' expenses.
Our work also has important implications for policy makers. Policy makers, as well
as many researchers studying the costs low income households face (e.g., Kaufman, 1997;
Chung & Myers, 1999), have often focused on the lack of access to supermarkets as a driver
of increased costs for everyday living. Our paper demonstrates that low income households
may have trouble buying in bulk and on sale even within the store types they already have
access to. This highlights the importance of enacting policies that take into consideration
factors that influence a household's decision making process. While providing greater access
to stores that offer bulk and temporary discounts could be helpful, policies designed to
provide liquidity relief may also be necessary. We hope that our results contribute to the
conversation on how our society can alleviate the additional financial burdens shouldered by
low income households.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Household-Years by Income Group
N (HH-YR) PCT Census
Income Group 1 (< $20K) 38,196 10.6% 19.1%
Income Group 2 ($20-40K) 91,545 25.3% 21.9%
Income Group 3 ($40-60K) 83,775 23.1% 17.0%
Income Group 4 ($60-100K) 99,646 27.5% 21.6%
Income Group 5 (> $100K) 48,950 13.5% 20.5%
Table 3.2: Average propensity of temporary discounts by brand and package size
Angel-Soft Charmin Kleenex Quilted N. Scott Pr. Label
1 Roll n/a 40.2% n/a n/a 13.6% 32.2%
4 Rolls 23.0% 35.3% 52.3% 28.8% 28.9% 14.7%
6 Rolls 44.2% 36.0% 39.9% 31.5% 28.6% 15.5%
9 Rolls 38.5% 41.9% 58.5% 50.4% 14.1% 35.1%
12 Rolls 31.5% 42.3% 57.3% 45.7% 51.4% 28.1%
24 Rolls 17.9% 37.7% 45.7% 30.7% 43.1% 37.1%
30 Rolls n/a 41.2% 64.4% 50.2% 28.7% 5.0%
36 Rolls 29.6% 26.3% 66.7% 4.4% 16.0% 2.6%
Table 3.3: Bulk discounts (per standardized roll) at grocery stores
4-Roll 12-Roll Discount 24-Roll Discount
Angel Soft Classic White $0.63 $0.55 12.4% $0.52 16.8%
Charmin $0.69 $0.55 20.7% $0.53 24.0%
Charmin Ultra-Soft $1.49 $1.09 26.7% $1.03 31.0%
Charmin Ultra-Strong $1.65 $1.15 30.3% $1.09 33.9%
Kleenex Cottonelle Ultra $1.43 $1.07 25.2% $1.10 22.7%
Quilted Northern $0.89 $0.68 24.1% $0.60 32.7%
Scott 1000 $0.31 $0.25 18.1% $0.12 61.4%
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Table 3.4: Bulk discounts averaged across channels and products
Package Size ∆ Unit Price (%)
1 Roll +29.4%
4 Rolls 
6 Rolls -8.4%
9 Rolls -15.2%
12 Rolls -19.8%
24 Rolls -25.3%
30 Rolls -43.3%
36 Rolls -44.2%
Table 3.5: Purchase Behavior Across Income Groups
INC1 INC2 INC3 INC4 INC5
Pct of purchases cheapest* | Size (Rolls) 35.1% 31.8% 30.6% 28.7% 27.4%
Pct of purchases made on sale 28.3% 31.6% 33.9% 36.8% 38.9%
Average UPC size purchased (rolls) 9.8 10.9 11.7 13.1 14.6
Average UPC size purchased (sheets) 3,277 3,611 3,866 4,306 4,835
Average interpurchase time (days) 38.8 39.2 39.8 42.9 48.4
*Summary statistics of purchases that match to the retail scanner dataset.
Table 3.6: Purchase frequency by channel
Avg Size* INC1 INC2 INC3 INC4 INC5
Discount 11.4 29.6% 31.1% 30.5% 28.4% 23.2%
Dollar 8.1 13.0% 8.2% 4.9% 3.0% 1.4%
Drug 9.6 7.5% 6.9% 6.2% 5.7% 5.5%
Grocery 9.4 43.2% 45.8% 47.9% 49.0% 50.8%
Warehouse 31.1 2.6% 4.5% 6.6% 10.2% 15.3%
Other 10.7 4.0% 3.6% 4.0% 3.7% 3.8%
* Average package size in standardized rolls
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Table 3.7: Purchase frequency and price-per-standardize-roll by Brand
Brand $/Roll* Sale % Purchase Frequency
INC1 INC2 INC3 INC4 INC5
Angel-Soft $0.55 27.8% 17.8% 17.7% 16.5% 14.9% 12.1%
Charmin $1.03 40.4% 18.2% 20.7% 22.3% 24.8% 28.2%
Kleenex Cottonelle $0.86 54.2% 9.4% 10.8% 12.1% 13.1% 13.7%
Quilted Northern $0.80 37.2% 9.8% 11.4% 12.6% 13.9% 14.8%
Scott $0.36 36.9% 11.3% 11.1% 10.7% 10.7% 10.9%
Store Brands $0.48 20.0% 24.1% 20.3% 18.5% 16.6% 15.8%
Other $0.50 20.6% 9.4% 8.0% 7.3% 6.0% 4.6%
* Average price-per-standardized roll for UPCs of given brand containing four rolls.
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Table 3.8: Demographic Summary Statistics
INC1 INC2 INC3 INC4 INC5
Household Size
One person 56.8% 34.8% 21.4% 12.1% 6.7%
Two people 27.7% 41.3% 45.7% 46.4% 46.3%
Three people 8.3% 11.6% 14.4% 17.2% 19.2%
Four people 4.4% 7.3% 11.2% 15.4% 18.4%
Five or more people 2.9% 5.0% 7.3% 8.9% 9.5%
Average household size 1.71 2.09 2.41 2.67 2.82
Female Household Head Education
Did not graduate high school 7.6% 4.3% 2.3% 1.2% 0.6%
High school grad 37.5% 35.7% 28.4% 19.7% 10.8%
Some college 34.0% 34.3% 33.4% 30.8% 23.7%
College grad 17.6% 20.8% 27.4% 34.9% 40.4%
Post college grad 3.4% 4.8% 8.5% 13.4% 24.6%
Male Household Head Max Education
Did not graduate high school 15.0% 10.3% 5.3% 2.6% 1.0%
High school grad 33.0% 36.0% 30.9% 21.4% 10.2%
Some college 29.6% 30.5% 31.6% 30.3% 21.3%
College grad 17.4% 18.8% 24.4% 32.4% 39.1%
Post college grad 5.0% 4.4% 7.8% 13.3% 28.4%
Marital Status
Married 25.3% 49.3% 65.6% 77.4% 84.8%
Widowed 22.0% 13.6% 6.0% 3.3% 1.8%
Divorced 31.1% 20.7% 14.3% 8.8% 5.6%
Single 21.6% 16.4% 14.1% 10.5% 7.8%
Race
White/Caucasian 85.7% 86.3% 84.9% 83.8% 81.5%
Black/African American 9.3% 8.7% 9.0% 8.9% 8.3%
Asian 0.7% 1.1% 1.9% 2.9% 5.8%
Other 4.3% 4.0% 4.2% 4.4% 4.4%
Type of Residence
One Family House 58.8% 71.1% 79.8% 87.0% 91.0%
One Family House (Condo/Coop) 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2%
Two Family 5.3% 4.3% 3.1% 2.1% 1.3%
Two Family House (Condo/Coop) 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4%
Three+ Family House 18.6% 10.2% 6.9% 4.1% 2.6%
Three+ Family House (Condo/Coop) 4.0% 4.3% 4.0% 3.2% 3.0%
Mobile Home or Trailer 11.8% 8.4% 4.4% 1.8% 0.5%
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Table 3.9: Household Average Daily Consumption (Sheets)*
INC1 INC2 INC3 INC4 INC5
Avg daily consumption, all HH 95.2 104.1 111.1 113.3 114.7
75th percentile 46.8 53.6 58.3 61.7 63.5
50th percentile 74.7 82.1 89.2 91.4 92.3
25th percentile 116.8 129.5 136.6 137.3 138.6
N (number of HH) 7,932 18,305 15,278 20,968 10,995
Avg daily consumption, single-person HH** 71.9 69.0 69.9 68.1 66.1
75th percentile 37.9 37.4 36.7 35.5 33.5
50th percentile 58.3 55.9 56.5 53.1 52.5
25th percentile 90.1 85.3 85.2 83.5 80.9
N (number of HH) 3,930 4,929 2,365 1,662 453
Avg daily consumption, multi-person HH*** 121.9 119.0 119.8 117.8 117.3
75th percentile 62.5 64.0 65.4 65.3 65.4
50th percentile 95.4 95.4 96.4 95.0 94.3
25th percentile 145.3 147.3 145.7 141.3 140.7
N (number of HH) 3,388 12,438 12,515 18,878 10,358
* Data in this table excludes households that changed income groups during the panel
** For households that never had more than one person during their time in the panel
*** For households that always had at least two people during their time in the panel
Table 3.10: Purchased package size (number of sheets) differences across income groups
Regression 3.1A 3.1B 3.1C 3.1D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
INC2 ($20-$40K) 334.4 11.23 216.0 5.55 167.8 5.48 124.1 4.23
INC3 ($40-$60K) 589.8 18.67 372.1 8.85 262.5 7.82 169.0 5.29
INC4 ($60-$100K) 1029.4 31.31 696.2 15.44 461.2 12.59 270.5 7.94
INC5 (> $100K) 1558.2 37.29 1104.2 20.70 720.3 16.36 391.6 9.88
[Consumption]h Yes Yes Yes
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,285
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Table 3.11: Difference between interpurchase time (in days) preceding sale and non-sale
purchases
Regression 3.2A 3.2B 3.2C 3.2D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Sale -1.246 -5.96 -1.311 -6.28 -1.308 -6.29 -0.939 -4.53
× INC2 -0.071 -0.30 0.053 0.22 0.134 0.57 0.207 0.89
× INC3 -0.800 -3.28 -0.666 -2.74 -0.495 -2.05 -0.370 -1.54
× INC4 -0.897 -3.66 -0.906 -3.71 -0.594 -2.45 -0.427 -1.77
× INC5 -0.939 -3.14 -1.298 -4.37 -0.842 -2.86 -0.685 -2.34
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,556,138
Table 3.12: Change in duration until next purchase, in response to sale
Regression 3.3A 3.3B 3.3C 3.3D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Sale 6.299 26.59 6.165 26.12 6.121 26.27 7.158 31.16
× INC2 -0.954 -3.64 -0.895 -3.43 -0.643 -2.50 -0.294 -1.16
× INC3 -2.255 -8.27 -2.170 -7.99 -1.634 -6.10 -0.989 -3.76
× INC4 -2.963 -10.78 -2.909 -10.63 -1.978 -7.35 -1.132 -4.29
× INC5 -3.138 -9.62 -3.148 -9.69 -1.794 -5.62 -0.911 -2.92
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,556,485
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Table 3.13: Proportion of purchases made on sale
Regression 3.4A 3.4B 3.4C 3.4D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Income Group 2 0.032 7.17 0.039 8.74 0.023 6.04 0.012 3.30
Income Group 3 0.056 11.72 0.063 12.99 0.038 8.79 0.020 4.96
Income Group 4 0.084 17.69 0.088 17.22 0.054 11.85 0.029 7.05
Income Group 5 0.106 18.95 0.097 15.90 0.057 10.39 0.023 4.58
[Consumption]h Yes Yes Yes
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Size]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,285
Table 3.14: Constructed inventory regressions
Average HH inventory (eq. 3.5) Sale as function of inventory (eq. 3.6)
AV GINVh I[sale]hp
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Inc Grp 2 -3.38 -0.04 Inventory 4.3E-07 11.37
Inc Grp 3 130.78 1.51 [Time]t Yes
Inc Grp 4 358.07 4.19 [Product]p Yes
Inc Grp 5 814.35 8.31 [Channel]ht Yes
[Consumption]h Yes [Size]pt Yes
N (households) 73,478 N (purchases) 2,729,285
Table 3.15: Change in purchased package size in response to sale
Package Size (Sheets)
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Sale 63.6 2.84 78.1 3.49 203.1 9.80 420.3 21.68
× INC2 -119.7 -4.88 -126.4 -5.16 -82.1 -3.65 -29.2 -1.39
× INC3 -245.6 -9.24 -255.5 -9.63 -152.8 -6.34 -58.4 -2.62
× INC4 -401.8 -14.43 -420.1 -15.10 -237.5 -9.50 -112.4 -4.92
× INC5 -530.7 -15.27 -561.9 -16.17 -296.9 -9.99 -172.5 -6.46
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,285
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Table 3.16: Impact of relaxing liquidity constraints on package size (sheets)
3.8A 3.8B 3.8C 3.8D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
First Week (ψ0) 53.1 4.39 59.8 4.94 59.9 5.39 60.0 5.65
× INC2 (ψ2) -66.4 -4.52 -70.4 -4.81 -70.1 -5.23 -62.8 -4.93
× INC3 (ψ3) -54.6 -3.62 -59.5 -3.95 -54.6 -3.98 -44.6 -3.44
× INC4 (ψ4) -58.1 -3.86 -65.6 -4.37 -64.7 -4.76 -53.3 -4.16
× INC5 (ψ5) -54.4 -2.87 -68.1 -3.59 -67.7 -4.01 -42.5 -2.71
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,285
Table 3.17: Impact of relaxing liquidity constraints on purchase acceleration
Purchase Acceleration
A B C D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Sale (δ0) -1.038 -4.52 -1.121 -4.90 -1.103 -4.84 -0.737 -3.24
× INC2 (δ2) -0.321 -1.24 -0.177 -0.68 -0.103 -0.40 -0.033 -0.13
× INC3 (δ3) -0.975 -3.67 -0.807 -3.05 -0.644 -2.45 -0.523 -2.00
× INC4 (δ4) -1.083 -4.05 -1.079 -4.05 -0.776 -2.93 -0.612 -2.32
× INC5 (δ5) -1.125 -3.48 -1.491 -4.64 -1.047 -3.28 -0.899 -2.83
1st Week (ψ0) 0.071 0.41 0.163 0.94 0.168 0.97 0.167 0.97
× INC2 (ψ2) -0.102 -0.50 -0.066 -0.32 -0.070 -0.34 -0.064 -0.32
× INC3 (ψ3) -0.129 -0.61 -0.025 -0.12 -0.029 -0.14 -0.025 -0.12
× INC4 (ψ4) 0.041 0.19 0.056 0.27 0.032 0.15 0.032 0.15
× INC5 (ψ5) -0.050 -0.18 -0.245 -0.89 -0.277 -1.01 -0.260 -0.95
1st Week × Sale (γ0) -0.840 -2.41 -0.757 -2.18 -0.817 -2.36 -0.804 -2.33
× INC2 (γ2) 1.038 2.50 0.946 2.29 0.976 2.37 0.988 2.40
× INC3 (γ3) 0.744 1.79 0.549 1.33 0.579 1.40 0.592 1.43
× INC4 (γ4) 0.698 1.70 0.630 1.54 0.667 1.63 0.682 1.67
× INC5 (γ5) 0.763 1.51 0.869 1.73 0.923 1.84 0.958 1.91
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,556,138
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Table 3.18: Regression - Impact of relaxing liquidity constraints on proportion of purchases
made on sale
Buying on Sale
A B C D
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
First Week 0.0031 2.04 0.0032 2.12 0.0023 1.55 0.0036 2.52
× INC2 -0.0033 -1.80 -0.0033 -1.80 -0.0026 -1.44 -0.0028 -1.63
× INC3 -0.0017 -0.92 -0.0018 -0.97 -0.0012 -0.67 -0.0018 -1.05
× INC4 -0.0031 -1.66 -0.0033 -1.77 -0.0026 -1.48 -0.0036 -2.07
× INC5 -0.0032 -1.47 -0.0038 -1.75 -0.0035 -1.63 -0.0049 -2.36
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes
[Size]p Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,285
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Appendices
Appendix 2.1: Data cleaning and sampling
We exclude respondents who (a) did not consider at least one car, (b) did not answer the
demographic, importance rating, or vehicle use questions included in our model, or (c) state
that they considered more than one vehicle but do not list those vehicles. To ensure the
proportion of consumers who considered multiple vehicles is not biased downward, we also
randomly drop an appropriate number of respondents whose set size was one, so that the
share of purchased vehicle classes among kept respondents is similar to that of dropped
respondents (see table below).
We sample from the remaining respondents in a manner inversely proportion to their
statistical weight (Maritz Research, Inc. provided us with an appropriately weighted sample,
based on their proprietary weighting methodology). Each observation is assigned a random
number from zero to one. That random number is divided by (WEIGHT/4) and the 750
observations with the lowest resulting numbers each quarter are kept for estimation. The
sampled observations are re-weighted to ensure that the (weighted) proportion of respondents
who purchased vehicle j in our data sample matches the (weighted) proportion among all
respondents who considered at least one car.
Table 3.19: Proportion of purchases per class, by data group
Dropped Kept
C Cars 11.3% 12.7%
CD Cars 8.1% 9.0%
Non-Premium Cars 10.2% 9.5%
Premium Cars 17.2% 18.0%
Small Utilities 8.3% 9.1%
Med/Lg Utilities & Vans 24.0% 26.2%
Trucks 20.8% 15.6%
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Appendix 2.2: Derivation of likelihood statement
There exists a set of alternatives A = {1, ..., K}. Consumer i has a consideration set Si
consisting of alternatives 1, . . . , k (but not alternatives k + 1, . . . , K), where ωn > ωn+1 for
all n. In other words, alternatives are sorted in decreasing order of consideration propensity.
The consumer has consideration propensities ωj for each alterantive j and also faces marginal
search costs of considering the nth alternative in their set c˜n. The consideration propensities
are a combination of a deterministic (wj) and random (j) component: ωj = wj + j. The
probability that Si is given by:
(1) Pr [ωj≤k > ωj>k , ωj≤k > c˜k , ωj>k < c˜k+1]
Where ωj≤k refers to the consideration propensity of each alternative j ≤ k
The probability statement from (1) can be shown to be equal to equation 2.10.
Since ωj≤k > max(c˜k, ωj>k), and ωj>k < min(c˜k+1, ωj≤k), then:
Pr [ωj≤k > ωj>k , ωj≤k > c˜k , ωj>k < c˜k+1]
(2) =
´ m=∞
m=−∞ Pr [ ωj≤k > min(c˜k+1,max(c˜k,m)) ] Pr [ min(m, c˜k+1) = maxj>k(ωj) ] dm
Since Pr [ min(m, c˜k+1) = maxj>k(ωj) ] =
d
dm
Pr [ min(m, c˜k+1) > maxj>k(ωj) ]
(3) =
´ m=∞
m=−∞ Pr [ ωj≤k > min(c˜k+1,max(c˜k,m)) ]
d
dm
Pr [ min(m, c˜k+1) > maxj>k(ωj) ] dm
(4) =
´ m=c˜k
m=−∞ Pr [ ωj≤k > c˜k ]
d
dm
Pr [m > maxj>k(ωj) ] dm
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
Pr [ ωj≤k > m ] ddm Pr [m > maxj>k(ωj) ] dm
+
´ m=∞
m=c˜k+1
Pr [ ωj≤k > c˜k+1 ] ddm Pr [ c˜k+1 > maxj>k(ωj) ] dm
Since d
dm
is not a function of m from (c˜k+1,∞), the third part of the integral in (4) is
equal to zero.
Set a =
∑j=K
j=k+1 exp(wj).
Since Pr [ ωj≤k > c˜k ] = [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))],
And since Pr [m > maxj>k(ωj) ] = exp(−
∑j=K
j=k+1 exp(wj) exp(−m)):
(5) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))]
´ m=c˜k
m=−∞
d
dm
[exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
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+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−m))] ddm [exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
Since exp(−∑j=Kj=k+1 exp(wj) exp(−m)) = 0´ m=c˜k
m=−∞
d
dm
[
exp(−∑j=Kj=k+1 exp(wj) exp(−m))] dm = exp(−a exp(−c˜k))− 0, so:
(6) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−m))] ddm [exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
If we set Ej = exp(− exp(wj) exp(−m))
Tt =
∑q= k!
t!(k−t)!
q=1
∏
j∈Gqt Ej,
Where Gqt is the q
th subset of alternatives j ∈ Si, of size t, of which there exist K!t!(K−t)!
Then:
(7) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
(1 +
∑t=k
t=1(−1)tTt) ddm [exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
(8) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
d
dm
[exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
[∑t=k
t=1(−1)tTt
]
d
dm
[exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
And, solving for the integral in the second part of (8):
(9) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+ exp(−a exp(−c˜k+1))− exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
[∑t=k
t=1(−1)tTt
]
d
dm
[exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
Set bqt =
∑
j∈Gqt exp(wj)
Then Tt =
∑q= k!
t!(k−t)!
q=1
∏
j∈Gqt Ej =
∑q= k!
t!(k−t)!
q=1 exp(−bqt exp(−m)), and:
(10) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+ exp(−a exp(−c˜k+1))− exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
[∑t=k
t=1(−1)t
∑q= k!
t!(k−t)!
q=1 exp(−bqt exp(−m))
]
d
dm
[exp(−a exp(−m))] dm
Since d
dm
[exp(−a exp(−m))] = a exp(−m) [exp(−a exp(−m))]:
(11) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
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+ exp(−a exp(−c˜k+1))− exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
∑t=k
t=1(−1)t
∑q= k!
t!(k−t)!
q=1 (a)
´ m=c˜k+1
m=c˜k
exp(−m) [exp(−(a+ bqt) exp(−m))] dm
And, solving for the integral:
(11) =
∏j=k
j=1 [1− exp(− exp(wj) exp(−c˜k))] exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+ exp(−a exp(−c˜k+1))− exp(−a exp(−c˜k))
+
∑t=k
t=1
∑q= k!
t!(k−t)!
q=1
(
(−1)ta
a+bqt
)
[exp(−(a+ bqt) exp(−c˜k+1))− exp(−(a+ bqt) exp(−c˜k))]
This gives us equation 2.10, though the notation in essay 2 is slightly different, as alter-
natives in our dataset are not number in decreasing order of consideration propensity.
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Appendix 2.3: Validation of model via simulation
To demonstrate that our likelihood function can be used in an estimation routine to accu-
rately retrieve the parameters governing the consideration set formation model developed
in our paper, we include here the results of two simulation studies. First, we generate syn-
thetic data for 30,000 consumers and 40 alternatives. Consideration propensity is a function
of 40 (partially heterogeneous, as with our real data) alternative-specific constants and 10
randomly generated covariates. The marginal search costs for the first, second, and fifth
alternative are (as with our real data) set to -99, 0, and 99. We simulate consideration sets
and then estimate the consideration stage of our model to verify that our likelihood state-
ment (equation 10 in the paper) can be used to accurately estimate the parameters of our
model.
As a second test, we also use our data sample and the parameter estimates from our full
model to simulate new consideration sets. We then re-estimate our model on these simulated
consideration sets. In the interest of space, we only include the primary parameters of interest
(since there are nearly 200).
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Table 3.20: Parameter Estimates from Simulation 1 (synthetic data)
Param. Actual Est. Param. Actual Est. Param. Actual Est.
ASC 1 -6.000 -5.920 ASC 21 -5.000 -4.900 c˜3 0.273 0.291
ASC 2 -5.950 -5.862 ASC 22 -4.950 -4.855 c˜4 0.496 0.517
ASC 3 -5.900 -5.798 ASC 23 -4.900 -4.790
ASC 4 -5.850 -5.711 ASC 24 -4.850 -4.753 σC,CD -0.300 -0.296
ASC 5 -5.800 -5.757 ASC 25 -4.800 -4.722 σ2CD 1.250 1.231
ASC 6 -5.750 -5.618 ASC 26 -4.750 -4.604
ASC 7 -5.700 -5.595 ASC 27 -4.700 -4.613 Covariate 1 0.664 0.654
ASC 8 -5.650 -5.536 ASC 28 -4.650 -4.549 Covariate 2 0.718 0.711
ASC 9 -5.600 -5.538 ASC 29 -4.600 -4.530 Covariate 3 0.354 0.360
ASC 10 -5.550 -5.443 ASC 30 -4.550 -4.462 Covariate 4 0.652 0.630
ASC 11 -5.500 -5.377 ASC 31 -4.500 -4.448 Covariate 5 0.211 0.209
ASC 12 -5.450 -5.396 ASC 32 -4.450 -4.364 Covariate 6 -0.688 -0.672
ASC 13 -5.400 -5.293 ASC 33 -4.400 -4.302 Covariate 7 -1.814 -1.793
ASC 14 -5.350 -5.236 ASC 34 -4.350 -4.267 Covariate 8 0.113 0.134
ASC 15 -5.300 -5.235 ASC 35 -4.300 -4.214 Covariate 9 -1.424 -1.142
ASC 16 -5.250 -5.179 ASC 36 -4.250 -4.156 Covariate 10 0.687 0.675
ASC 17 -5.200 -5.136 ASC 37 -4.200 -4.112
ASC 18 -5.150 -5.039 ASC 38 -4.150 -4.084
ASC 19 -5.100 -4.943 ASC 39 -4.100 -3.986
ASC 20 -5.050 -4.971 ASC 40 -4.050 -3.995
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Table 3.21: Parameter Estimates from Simulation 1 (real data)
Parameters Actual Est.
Search Costs
c˜3 0.218 0.257
c˜4 0.399 0.531
Heterogeneity Covariance Matrix
σC,CD -0.300 -0.347
σ2CD 1.252 1.210
Redesign Variables
Hyundai Elantra 0.745 0.644
VW Jetta 0.326 0.340
Subaru Legacy 0.305 1.003
Kia Optima 1.272 1.340
Subaru Outback 0.743 0.545
Hyundai Sonata 1.037 1.117
Recall and Tsunami Variables
Recall - Toyota C/CD Cars -0.242 -0.337
Tsunami - Toyota C/CD Cars -0.150 -0.057
Tsunami - Toyota B/DE Cars -0.769 -0.481
Tsunami - Honda C/CD Cars -0.371 -0.532
Tsunami - Honda B/DE Cars -0.423 -0.429
Tsunami - Other Japanese C/CD -0.098 -0.099
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Appendix 2.4: Specifics of the empirical model
Alternatives modeled
We simplify the alternative space in the following ways: (1) We subsume all trims, model
years, and fuel types of a nameplate into a single alternative. (2) We do not model Hyundai
Veloster or Suzuki Reno, which accounted for 0.04% of purchases. (3) We condense the
GLI, GTI, R32, and Rabbit (all variants of the VW Golf) into a single alternative. All four
vehicles were replaced with a single VW Golf nameplate after the 2009 model year (which
we treat as a separate alternative). (4) We condense all but three of the alternatives outside
of the C and CD car classes into 19 vehicle class / continent of origin outside options. We
have three continents of origin (Asia, Europe, North America) and seven vehicle classes (B
Cars, DE Cars, Premium Cars, Premium Utilities, Small Utilities, Large Utilities / Vans,
and Trucks), but do not model European B Cars or Trucks (0.02% and 0.05% of all purchases
in our sample, respectively). We model the Honda Fit (B Car), Toyota Yaris (B Car), and
Toyota Avalon (DE Car) independently from the outside options in order to facilitate more
accurate estimates of substitution patterns in response to the recalls and tsunami, which
primarily affected Toyota and Honda. In total we model 76 alternatives (54 C/CD cars and
22 other alternatives). Our decision to exclude or condense some alternatives was made for
estimation speed and stability.
Observable heterogeneity (Xij)
The NVCS asks respondents if the vehicle they have just purchased was intended to replace
another vehicle. If respondents answer yes, they also list details about the vehicle being
replaced (vehicle make, model, and class). Call the vehicle being replaced vehicle k. We
include 17 interaction dummy variables equal to one if alternative j is (a) the same alternative
as k, (b) made by the same manufacturer as k, (c) from the same vehicle class as k, or (d)
from the same continent of origin as k. We also include variables equal to one if k is from
vehicle class X and j is from another class Y in an effort to measure the likelihood of one class
being replaced by another. Xij also includes similar interactions for other vehicles owned
but not being replaced.
A total of 38 demographic interaction terms are also included in Xij. We measure how
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loyal various age groups are to a manufacturer, and include income group and gender ×
vehicle class interactions. We also include 30 importance and product use interactions. We
measure whether self-reported brand loyalty influences a consumer's decision to consider or
purchase from a manufacturer they have purchased before. We also measure the degree to
which consumers who think the fuel used by a vehicle is important were more or less inclined
to consider certain classes of vehicles. Another set of interaction terms were related to vehicle
use. We interact consumers' self-reported tendency to use their vehicle to take their kids to
school, tow, haul cargo, and go off-roading with vehicle class dummies.
Unavailability variable
Ujtis a nuisance variable that controls for abnormally low consideration/purchase during the
first quarter or at the tail end of a vehicle's availability. This might occur if (for example) a
vehicle was launched mid-quarter or if a limited supply of a discontinued vehicle remained
at dealerships. We set Ujt = 1 under two conditions. First, if t was the first quarter that
vehicle j was available and its market share was less than 50% of its market share in quarter
t + 1. Second, if the market share for a vehicle in its final model year drops by more than
50% from t to t+ 1, we set Ujt′ = 1∀t′ > t.
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Appendix 2.5: Estimation algorithm
Recall that the specification of the consideration set formation level of the model is:
ωijt = αij + γDjt + δRjt + λEjt + βXij + ηUjt + ijt
c˜3 = exp(θ3) c˜4 = c˜3 + exp(θ4)
uijt = α
c
j + γ
cDjt + δ
cRjt + λ
cEjt + β
cXcij + η
cUjt + ζ
cPjt + εijt
αij = αj + ξil
(
ξi,C
ξi,CD
)
∼MVN(0, Σξ) Σξ =
[
σ2C σC,CD
σC,CD σ
2
CD
]
Define Θ = {α, β, γ, δ, λ, η, θ}. We use diffuse multivariate normal priors (MVN(0,50))
for the homogeneous parameters in Θ. Additionally, we use a (conjugate) Inverse-Wishart
prior W−1
([
2 0
0 2
]
, 2
)
for Σξ. For each iteration of our estimation algorithm, we have
three steps:
1. Draw Σξ in a Gibbs step in unidentified space using the previous iteration's values for
ξi,C and ξi,CD, then post-process the draw by dividing Σξ by σ
2
C .
2. Draw each heterogeneous parameter ξi,C and ξi,CD for each consumer in a Metropolis-
Hastings step using the values for σC,CD and σ
2
CD from step one.
3. Draw each homogeneous parameter in Θ in a Metropolis-Hastings step using the most
recently drawn values of all other parameters.
The restricted version of the model follows the same algorithm, except that search costs
are set to zero rather than estimated. The choice stage of the model is estimated separately,
using the same algorithm, but without search costs or homogeneous alternative specific
constants (i.e., only step 3 of the algorithm is used for choice).
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Appendix 2.6: Counterfactual simulation methodology
The data sample used for estimation is also used to run our simulations. We run a baseline
simulation and counterfactual simulations using both the full and restricted model. The
counterfactual simulations include No Recall and No Tsunami counterfactuals, where the
effect of these events were removed by setting the associated parameters to zero. Also run
were two counterfactuals for each of the six redesigned vehicles. One removes the effect of the
redesign by setting the associated parameter to zero and reducing the price of the vehicle to
pre-redesign levels. The second reduces price by $1,000 but does not set the recall parameter
to zero.
We run each simulation 5,000 times, simulating a consideration set and calculating cor-
responding conditional choice probabilities for each respondent. For each iteration of the
baseline simulation, consideration sets and choice probabilities are generated using one set
of parameter estimates drawn from the MCMC chain from estimation. For our counter-
factual simulations, we modify the parameter estimates to reflect the appropriate scenario.
Consideration sets are simulated as follows. We construct each respondent's consideration
propensity (ωij) by summing (1) random draws for heterogeneous preference for vehicle
class, ξi,C and ξi,CD, (2) the homogeneous portion of consideration propensity, and (3) the
stochastic component, ijt. Using ωij and our cost parameter estimates, c˜n, we identify which
alternatives a respondent considers. Lastly, using our parameter estimates for choice utility,
we generate choice probabilities for each alternative in each consumer's consideration set.
We weight each consideration set and all choice probabilities by the weight of the respondent
for which it was generated. We calculate the number of considerations and purchases each
vehicle received per 100 consumers. To identify the effect of a redesign, the Tsunami, or
the Toyota Recalls, we subtract the results of the baseline simulation from the results of the
counterfactual simulation.
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Appendix 2.7: Secondary parameter estimates
Table 3.22: Secondary Parameter Estimates - Purchase History
Parameters Consid (Full) Consid (Rest) Choice Model
Purchase History Est. Est. Est.
Vehicle being purchased (j) shares attribute with replaced vehicle (k)
Vehicle j & k same nameplate 1.171 * 1.193 * -0.130 n/s
Vehicle j & k same US manuf. 0.905 * 0.912 * 0.038 n/s
Vehicle j & k same Euro manuf. 0.994 * 0.981 * -0.015 n/s
Vehicle j & k same Japan manuf. 1.706 * 1.692 * 0.317 n/s
Vehicle j & k same Korean manuf. 1.574 * 1.575 * 0.281 n/s
Vehicle j & k both Honda -0.926 * -0.910 * 0.203 n/s
Vehicle j & k both Toyota -0.992 * -0.969 * -0.190 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - B Car 1.156 * 1.173 * 0.302 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - C Car -0.110 n/s -0.097 n/s 0.185 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - CD Car 0.527 * 0.489 * -0.145 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - DE Car 1.485 * 1.467 * -0.132 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - Prm Car 0.979 * 1.003 * 0.199 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - Sm Util 0.728 * 0.726 * 0.234 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - Util/Van 0.766 * 0.736 * -0.045 n/s
Vehicle j & k same class - Truck 0.764 * 0.796 * 1.714 *
Vehicle j & k same cont. - Asia 0.247 * 0.254 * 0.028 n/s
Vehicle j & k same cont. - N.A. 1.007 * 1.008 * 0.063 n/s
Vehicle j & k same cont. - Euro 0.940 * 0.947 * 0.234 n/s
Vehicle being purchased (j) shares attribute with owned vehicle (k)
Vehicle j & k same manuf. 0.796 * 0.800 * 0.245 *
Vehicle j & k same cont. - Asia 0.219 * 0.198 * 0.058 n/s
Vehicle j & k same cont. - N.A. 0.362 * 0.359 * -0.206 n/s
Vehicle j & k same cont. - Euro 0.636 * 0.635 * 0.190 n/s
Vehicle k small car - j small car -0.019 n/s -0.035 n/s - -
Vehicle k small car - j large car -0.695 * -0.696 * - -
Vehicle k small car - j other -0.261 * -0.249 * - -
Vehicle k large car - j small car -0.691 * -0.694 * - -
Vehicle k large car - j large car -0.441 * -0.440 * - -
Vehicle k large car - j other -0.198 * -0.178 * - -
Vehicle k other - j small car -0.147 * -0.179 * - -
Vehicle k other - j large car -0.224 * -0.251 * - -
Vehicle k other - j other 0.449 * 0.449 * - -
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Table 3.23: Secondary Parameter Estimates - Demographics
Parameters Consid (Full) Consid (Rest) Choice Model
Demographics Est. Est. Est.
Interaction: Income Group × Vehicle Class
Inc Grp 2 × B Car 0.852 * 0.855 * - -
Inc Grp 2 × C Car 0.570 * 0.569 * - -
Inc Grp 2 × CD Car -0.148 n/s -0.118 n/s - -
Inc Grp 2 × DE Car -0.173 n/s -0.155 n/s - -
Inc Grp 2 × Prem Car -1.479 * -1.498 * - -
Inc Grp 2 × Small Util -0.306 n/s -0.289 n/s - -
Inc Grp 2 × Prem Util -1.492 * -1.528 * - -
Inc Grp 2 × Util / Van -0.698 * -0.719 * - -
Inc Grp 2 × Truck 1.097 * 1.059 * - -
Inc Grp 3 × B Car 0.683 * 0.690 * - -
Inc Grp 3 × C Car 0.431 * 0.427 * - -
Inc Grp 3 × CD Car 0.057 n/s 0.054 n/s - -
Inc Grp 3 × DE Car 0.094 n/s 0.103 n/s - -
Inc Grp 3 × Prem Car -0.907 * -0.918 * - -
Inc Grp 3 × Small Util 0.006 n/s 0.019 n/s - -
Inc Grp 3 × Prem Util -1.540 * -1.550 * - -
Inc Grp 3 × Util / Van -0.264 * -0.242 n/s - -
Inc Grp 3 × Truck 0.819 * 0.814 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × B Car 0.560 * 0.552 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × C Car 0.316 * 0.301 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × CD Car 0.144 * 0.135 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × DE Car 0.174 * 0.172 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × Prem Car -0.553 * -0.568 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × Small Util 0.023 n/s 0.019 n/s - -
Inc Grp 4 × Prem Util -0.954 * -0.945 * - -
Inc Grp 4 × Util / Van 0.119 n/s 0.120 n/s - -
Inc Grp 4 × Truck 0.642 * 0.614 * - -
Male × B Car -0.252 * -0.263 * - -
Male × C Car -0.048 n/s -0.052 n/s - -
Male × CD Car -0.096 * -0.093 * - -
Male × DE Car 0.190 * 0.207 * - -
Male × Prem Car 0.124 * 0.132 * - -
Male × Small Util -0.450 * -0.440 * - -
Male × Premium Util -0.208 n/s -0.202 n/s - -
Male × Util / Van -0.310 * -0.297 * - -
Male × Truck 1.258 * 1.215 * - -
Interaction: Age × Shared Manufactuer (j & k)
(50 > Age ≥ 30) × same manuf. 0.099 n/s 0.133 n/s 0.318 n/s
(Age ≥ 50) × same manuf. 0.310 * 0.356 * 0.360 n/s
88
Table 3.24: Secondary Parameter Estimates - Product Use & Importance
Parameters Consid (Full) Consid (Rest) Choice Model
Interaction: Fuel Efficiency is important to consumer × Vehicle Class
Important × B Car 0.527 * 0.513 * - -
Important × C Car 0.439 * 0.418 * - -
Important × CD Car -0.010 n/s -0.040 n/s - -
Important × DE Car -0.893 * -0.924 * - -
Important × Prem Car -0.732 * -0.745 * - -
Important × Sm Util -0.001 n/s -0.012 n/s - -
Important × Prem Util -0.756 * -0.780 * - -
Important × Util / Van -0.738 * -0.771 * - -
Important × Truck -0.133 n/s -0.184 n/s - -
Interaction: Stated Use for Vehicle× Vehicle Class
Kids to School × Small Car 0.483 * 0.449 * - -
Kids to School × Large Car -0.081 n/s -0.118 * - -
Kids to School × Prem Util -0.194 n/s -0.224 n/s - -
Kids to School × Non-Pr Util 0.206 n/s 0.160 n/s - -
Kids to School × Truck 0.404 n/s 0.384 n/s - -
Towing × Small Car -0.508 * -0.525 * - -
Towing × Large Car 0.163 n/s 0.173 n/s - -
Towing × Prem Util 0.354 n/s 0.411 n/s - -
Towing × NonxPrem Util 0.529 * 0.512 * - -
Towing × Truck 0.981 * 0.957 * - -
Hauling × Small Car 0.405 * 0.363 * - -
Hauling × Large Car -0.194 * -0.225 * - -
Hauling × Prem Util 0.631 * 0.588 * - -
Hauling × NonxPrem Util 0.593 * 0.564 * - -
Hauling × Truck 0.400 n/s 0.310 n/s - -
Off-Roading × Small Car -0.275 * -0.304 * - -
Off-Roading × Large Car 0.041 n/s 0.008 n/s - -
Off-Roading × Prem Util 0.816 * 0.744 * - -
Off-Roading × Non-Prem Util 1.052 * 1.021 * - -
Off-Roading × Truck 1.222 * 1.248 * - -
Interaction: Stated Brand Loyal × Shared manufacturer (j & k)
Loyal (4/5) × j & k same manuf. 0.447 * 0.465 * 0.535 *
Loyal (5/5) × j & k same manuf. 0.560 * 0.606 * 1.003 *
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Appendix 3.1: Construction of variables
We describe in this section how we constructed three variables for our analyses: (1) Package
size, (2) household consumption rate, and (3) household inventory.
We construct the package size variable, Shtp, using three variables in the Nielsen dataset:
size1_amount, multi, and upc_descr. The variable size1_amount indicates the num-
ber of units in the UPC (for this category, the number of rolls), while multi indicates the
number of units in a multi-pack. An example of a multi pack would be a UPC contain-
ing 36 rolls, coming in six separately wrapped packages of six rolls. Shtp is equal to the
product of size1_amount, multi, and the number of sheets per roll contained within the
UPC, which is extracted from the variable upc_descr. In the 36-roll UPC example given,
size1_amount would be equal to six, as would multi.
We calculate each household's average daily consumption rate (Ch) as the sum of all its
purchases (in sheets) except its last, divided by the number of days between its first and
last purchase. The implicit assumption here is that the household's consumption between
the day of its first purchase and the day before its last purchase is equal to the amount
purchased during that time; or, equivalently, that a household's inventory level at the time
of its first purchase is equal to its inventory at the time of its last purchase. Because we do
not observe how long a household waited before purchasing toilet paper again following its
last purchase in the data, we do not use that purchase in the construction of average daily
consumption.
This consumption rate is also used to construct a household's inventory, in line with
Neslin et al. (1985). The inventory variable is constructed as follows. At the time of each
purchase, t, a household's inventory (INVht) is calculated as the inventory at the time of the
previous purchase (INVh,t−1) plus the volume of toilet paper (size × quantity) previously
purchased (Vh,t−1) minus the household's consumption (days since previous purchase times
consumption rate: IPTht×Ch):
INVht = INVh,t−1 + Vh,t−1 − IPThtCh (3.12)
The household's average inventory variable (AV GINVh) is constructed by taking the
average of a household's inventory across all days between its first and last purchase in the
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panel. Note that the variable INVht is linked to purchase occasions t, and not days. However,
daily inventory (INVhd) for each day, d, is constructed in much the same way:
INVhd = INVh,d−1 + Vh,d−1 − Ch (3.13)
Here Vh,d−1 refers to the volume purchased on day d− 1, which more often than not will
be equal to zero. The average inventory for a household whose first and last purchases were
Dh days apart, then, is given by:
AV GINVh =
∑
d INVhd
Dh
(3.14)
A well-documented limitation of constructing inventory variables is the initial conditions
problem (Hendel and Nevo, 2006a). A common solution is to use the first few observations
for each household to initialize an inventory level. The downside to this approach is that a
portion of our data cannot be used for estimation. Rather than sacrifice data, we set a house-
hold's starting inventory at zero. Note that we have two hypotheses related to inventory: (1)
That higher income households have larger inventories, and (2) that the probability of pur-
chasing on sale is increasing in inventory. If the first hypothesis is true, then higher income
households should, on average, have larger starting inventories than low income households,
and our assumption of zero starting inventory will lead us to underestimate the inventory
of higher income households relative to that of low income households. Consequently, our
assumption is a conservative one, and will not lead us to erroneously find support for our
hypothesis. With respect to the second hypothesis, the impact of inventory on probability of
purchasing on sale in a within-household regression is identified not by a household's absolute
level of inventory, but by the differences in household inventory from purchase to purchase.
Since initializing inventory merely adds a constant term (relative to the baseline assumption
of zero) to a household's inventory level across a household's purchases, our assumption will
not affect the test of hypothesis two.
Note also that our inventory variable is allowed to be negative. Our constructed inventory
is actually a measure of the change in inventory relative to each household's true initial
inventory level, which is unobserved and normalized to zero. Negative inventory, then, can
be interpreted as a decrease in a household's inventory level since its first purchase.
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Appendix 3.2: Data cleaning
We make an effort to conservatively correct two data issues: (1) recording discrepancies for
package size, and (2) households that failed to report some of their purchases.
For 48 UPCs accounting for 8,616 purchases, the size1_amount and/or multi variables
appear to be miscoded, generating unreasonably large values for Shtp. For example, there
is one UPC for which the value of both size1_amount and multi are 36, suggesting
that there are 1,296 rolls in the UPC. We attempt to correct these recording discrepancies
manually, identifying the correct value for sheets and rolls by comparing the UPC to other
UPCs from the same manufacturer and with other similar features. In the example just
cited, the correct package size was 36. We determined that for this UPC, only one of
size1_amount and multi should have been 36, with the other equal to one. The price of
the UPC is similar to that of other 36-roll UPCs from the same manufacturer. The results
presented in the paper are for these corrected values of package size. As a robustness check,
we also run all package-size related analyses excluding all households with a problematic
observation. The results of both approaches are not materially different, and the results of
the latter approach are available from the authors upon request.
The second data issue is more complicated to address. The raw homescan data indicate
that some households may have failed to scan at least one purchase during their time in the
panel. The interpurchase time between two purchases for a household is often so large as to
be clearly inaccurate, likely due to the household forgetting to scan a purchase (or multiple)
at some point in between. For example, some interpurchase times are several years in length.
This missingness affects three variables in our analyses:
1. Interpurchase time: Missing purchases bias the calculated interpurchase time (time
since previous purchase) for the purchase following the missing purchase. E.g., if purchases
A, B, and C are made six months apart, but B is missing, the interpurchase time preceding
purchase C will appear in the data to be twelve months, rather than six.
2. Consumption rate: Missing purchases bias the consumption rate for a household
downward.
3. Inventory: Because inventory is calculated as a function of purchases (some of which
are missing) and consumption (which is biased downward), inventory is clearly biased. But
since both factors contributing to the calculation of inventory are affected, it is unclear in
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which direction inventory is biased.
To fix this issue, we identify active periods for a householda set of consecutive pur-
chases over the course of which we do not believe any purchase is missingand use only
these active periods for our analyses (how we determine missingness will be discussed
shortly). To illustrate this approach, we provide a simple example. Consider a household
that makes twelve purchases during two active periods (a = 1, 2), where active period a = 1
was from Jan 1, 2006 to Dec 31, 2006 and active period a = 2 was from Jan 1, 2010 to
Dec 31, 2010. Rather than treating the five-year period spanning 2006 through 2010 as a
household's time-in-panel, we treat the years of 2006 and 2010 as active periods. Conse-
quently, the four-year gap between the two active periods is treated as missing, and (1)
does not bias upward the interpurchase time of the first observation in the second active
period, which we treat as missing (rather than taking the four-year interpurchase time at
face value), and (2) does not bias our estimates of consumption rates or inventories, which
are calculated using only the active periods.
To be more precise, our approach is as follows:
1: Identify missingness
We first identify observations that we believe follow a missing purchase (i.e., observations
with unreasonably long interpurchase times). To do this, we identify the average duration
until next purchase following purchase of each package size s: E[Durations]. For example,
following a purchase of a UPC containing twelve rolls of toilet paper, households wait 46.5
days before purchasing again, on average. We also identify the standard deviation of these
durations: σs.
10 For UPCs containing twelve rolls, the standard deviation of duration until
next purchase is 61.3 days. If the time between two purchases, made during trips t and
t + 1, exceeds the mean interpurchase time for the package size purchased during trip t by
more than two standard deviations, then we conclude that the household failed to report a
purchase between t and t + 1. Mathematically, if package size s was purchased during trip
t, we conclude that there is a missing observation between t and t+ 1 if:
IPTh(t+1)p > E[Durations] + 2σs (3.15)
If we conclude that there is a missing observation between t and t + 1, trip t marks the
end of one active period and t+ 1 marks the beginning of a new active period. If, for a given
trip t , more than one UPC was purchased, and/or if the quantity of the UPC(s) purchased
10Note that E[Durations] and σs are calculated using trips that feature only a single package size being
purchased, in quantity 1.
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was greater than one (e.g. three copies of a UPC), then the reference point used to identify
whether a purchase is missing is a simple sum of the means (E[Durations]) and standard
deviations (σs) of the purchase times corresponding to the purchased sizes. For example,
if two packages of size 4 and one of size 12 were purchased during trip t, we conclude that
there is a missing observation between t and t+ 1 if:
IPTh(t+1)p > 2(E[Durations=4] + 2σs=4) + E[Durations=12] + 2σs=12 (3.16)
2: Calculate a household's daily consumption rate
For households that we believe have a missing purchase, we construct consumption as the
average rate of consumption over active periods. The daily consumption rate for a household
with A active periods is calculated as:∑A
a=1
∑Pa−1
p=1 Vhpa∑a=A
a=1 Ta
(3.17)
Here Vhpa is the volume of toilet paper for purchase p during active period a, Pa is the
total number of purchases made during period a, and Ta is the time between the first and
last purchase during active period a. Recall that previously, consumption was constructed
by summing all volume purchased by a household except for that of the last purchase,
then dividing that sum by the number of days a household was in the panel. The logic
behind this was that a household's consumption rate should reflect the relationship between
volume purchased and the time over which the purchased volume was consumedand since
a household's time in panel ends with the last purchase, that last purchase should not be
included, as it clearly would not be consumed during the time in panel. We take a similar
approach here, excluding the last purchase of each active period.
3: Calculate a household's inventory
Much like we did with consumption, we calculate inventory separately for each active period
a household has. At the start of a household's first active period, we initialize inventory at
zero (as we do for households without any missing purchases). For the second active period
(and beyond), we use the inventory level at the end of the previous active period as the initial
level of inventory for the current active period. The implicit assumption corresponding to our
calculation of consumption and inventory is that the inventory level at the start and end of a
household's time in the panel is the samemirroring the implicit assumption for households
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without missing purchases. An additional implicit assumption specific to households with
more than one active period is that a household's consumption and purchase volume are
equal in the time between active periods.
Resulting summary statistics & robustness checks
We noted previously that interpurchase times were sometimes unreasonably long. Below is a
chart detailing interpurchase times following purchases of sizes s = 4, 12, 24 for both the raw
and cleaned data. It provides the interquartile range, minimum, and maximum interpurchase
times, as well as the number of interpurchase times set to missing post-cleaning.
Table 3.25: Duration until next purchase summary statistics
4-Roll 12-Roll 24-Roll
Raw Clean Raw Clean Raw Clean
25th pct 7 7 17 17 23 22
50th pct 15 15 30 29 41 40
75th pct 30 28 55 51 71 68
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 2,269 137 2,379 169 2,039 216
N 421,314 411,075 817,833 793,869 201,876 195,536
% Missing - 2.4% - 2.9% - 3.1%
Cleaning the data relabels 2-3% of interpurchase times to missing (last row in Table
3.25), but conservatively eliminates absurd data patterns (e.g. not purchasing toilet paper
for 2,269 days after buying a 4-pack). Our approach is fairly conservative. Note that for
4-roll UPCs, the maximum IPT in the cleaned data is still 137 days.
In addition to cleaning the data, we also drop households that appear to be outliers. We
identify outliers along three dimensions: A household's daily per-person consumption rate,
average inventory, and maximum purchase volume per trip. Summary statistics for each are
provided in Table 3.26, in terms of standardized rolls.
We drop households if:
(1) Their consumption rate is greater than one standardized roll per person, per day
(>99th percentile); or less than 0.01 standardized rolls per person, per day (7.75 standardized
rolls per year; 1st percentile).
(2) They purchase more than 175 rolls of toilet paper in a single day at any point during
their time in the panel (99th percentile).
(3) They have an average (constructed) inventory >175 or <-175 rolls. In other words,
their inventory was 175 rolls higher or lower, on average, than its starting point, which we
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Table 3.26: Consumption, inventory, and purchase volume summary statistics
Consumption Average Inventory Max Volume
Raw Clean Raw Clean Raw Clean*
25th pct 0.06 0.07 2.33 2.58 16.94 -
50th pct 0.10 0.11 9.47 8.72 26.25 -
75th pct 0.16 0.17 21.87 19.24 44.63 -
Minimum 0.00 0.00 -1352.5 -1249.9 1.24
Maximum 23.34 36.46 1044.0 999.4 2625.44
HH 110,853 110,853 110,853 110,853 110,853 110,853
* Note that HH max purchase volume was not affected by our data cleaning
normalize to zero. (>99th pct)
(4) They have more than three missing observations.
(5) Consumption cannot be calculated, because the few observations we have for the
household are spaced around missing observations.
As a result of these criteria, 4.4% of households and 2.6% of observations are dropped
(Table 3.27). Note that our results are not sensitive to dropping these householdsall hy-
potheses are supported even if the analyses are run on all data. Table 3.28 has the results
for the set of analyses from section five, using all controls, without outliers dropped. In the
interest of space, not all analyses are replicated here, but they are available from the authors
upon request.
Table 3.27: Dropped observations
Criteria HH dropped Obs dropped
HH % HH Obs % Obs
Consumption cannot be calculated: 2,015 1.8% 5,018 0.2%
Consumption > 1 roll per person/day: 2,478 2.2% 16,817 0.6%
Consumption < 7.75 rolls per person/year: 1,118 1.0% 5,500 0.2%
HH with >3 "missing" observations: 3,069 2.7% 51,969 1.9%
HH with > 175 rolls in a single trip: 1,343 1.2% 39,901 1.4%
HH w/ avg inventory > +/-175 rolls: 2,372 2.1% 29,585 1.1%
Total observations: 112,868 - 2,802,879 -
Total "outliers" dropped: 5,006 4.4% 73,564 2.6%
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Table 3.28: First week analyses, no dropped observations
Package Size Purch. Accel. Sale
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
1st Week (ψ0) 55.3 5.66 0.187 1.23 0.0035 2.71
× INC2 (ψ2) -60.4 -5.23 -0.102 -0.56 -0.0028 -1.80
× INC3 (ψ3) -44.4 -3.72 0.004 0.02 -0.0018 -1.15
× INC4 (ψ4) -48.7 -4.07 0.039 0.21 -0.0037 -2.33
× INC5 (ψ5) -38.2 -2.59 -0.272 -1.09 -0.0047 -2.47
Sale (δ0) - - -0.745 -3.76 - -
× INC2 (δ2) - - -0.017 -0.08 - -
× INC3 (δ3) - - -0.496 -2.18 - -
× INC4 (δ4) - - -0.587 -2.56 - -
× INC5 (δ5) - - -0.926 -3.35 - -
1st Week × Sale (γ0) - - -0.912 -2.84 - -
× INC2 (γ2) - - 1.084 2.84 - -
× INC3 (γ3) - - 0.644 1.68 - -
× INC4 (γ4) - - 0.746 1.96 - -
× INC5 (γ5) - - 1.106 2.37 - -
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Appendix 3.3: Buying on sale as a function of inventory
shifters
Buying in bulk allows households to carry higher levels of inventory. This, in turn, gives
them more time until their current stock of inventory runs out and they must purchase
againand more time to wait for a sale to present itself. Following this logic, we tested
to see whether a household's probability of buying on sale was increasing in its inventory
(section ??). However, because inventory is unobserved, we had to impute it. As a robustness
check, we now test whether a household's probability of buying on sale is increasing in two
observable boosters of inventory.
Greater purchase volumes provide larger boosts to inventory, and should allow a house-
hold more time until they must purchase again. A household with any current level of
inventory INVht will run out of that inventory earlier if they purchase a 4-roll UPC during
the current shopping trip than they will if they purchase a 24-roll UPC. Consequently, we
can indirectly test whether a household's probability of buying on sale is increasing in its
inventory by testing whether a household's probability of sale is increasing in its volume
purchased during the last purchase occasion (Vh(t−1)).
Similarly, since sale purchases are typically of greater volume than non-sale purchases, we
can also test whether a household's probability of buying on sale is higher if its last purchase
was also made on sale (I[sale]h(t−1) = 1).
We again employ the linear probability model, regressing the binary sale variable I[sale]htp
on Vh(t−1) or I[sale]h(t−1) = 1, as well as our standard controls:
I[sale]htp = αh + ρVh(t−1) +
5∑
i=2
βiI[INC = i]Vh(t−1)
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]p + η6[Size]p + htp (3.18)
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I[sale]htp = αh + ρI[sale]h(t−1) +
5∑
i=2
βiI[INC = i]I[sale]h(t−1)
+ η3[Time]t + η4[Product]p + η5[Channel]ht + η6[Size]p + htp (3.19)
We find that a household's propensity to buy on sale is indeed increasing in the volume of
the last purchase and higher if the previously purchased UPC was on sale (ρ > 0, Table 3.29).
Additionally, the increase in propensity to buy on sale is highest for low income households.
We find βi < 0 for several of the higher income groups. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that low income households carry lower inventory levels. An increase in inventory
of any amount will provide a more meaningful increase in a household's ability to wait for sale
the lower its inventory was prior to purchase. Since low income households carry smaller
inventories than higher income households, they should benefit the most from any given
increase in inventory.
To illustrate this, we'll use a simple example. Compare two households with inventories
of 1 and 30 rolls of toilet paper, each of which chooses to purchase a 24-roll UPC instead
of a 4-roll UPC. The first household (inventory of 1) is much more likely to observe, and be
able to take advantage of, a sale before their next purchase with an inventory of 25 rolls (1 +
24) than with an inventory of 5 rolls (1 + 4). By contrast, the second household (inventory
of 30) may see only a marginal increase in their probability of buying on sale during their
next purchase occasion as a consequence of increasing their inventory to 54 (30 + 24) rather
than 34 (30 + 4), as both an inventory of 54 and 34 are likely to last long enough for the
household to observe and take advantage of a sale before having to purchase again.
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Table 3.29: Purchasing on sale as a function of past purchase
IV: Sheets (t-1) Sheets (t-1) Sale (t-1) Sale (t-1)
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Prev. Purch. 1.8E-06 7.96 1.5E-06 7.09 0.095 30.72 0.088 29.74
× INC2 -3.7E-07 -1.52 -3.0E-07 -1.26 -0.009 -2.58 -0.008 -2.50
× INC3 -4.2E-07 -1.63 -2.7E-07 -1.09 -0.014 -3.86 -0.013 -3.70
× INC4 -7.6E-07 -3.01 -5.9E-07 -2.39 -0.022 -6.22 -0.021 -6.01
× INC5 -8.5E-07 -3.01 -6.2E-07 -2.28 -0.030 -7.59 -0.028 -7.27
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes Yes Yes
[Size]p Yes Yes Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes Yes
N (purchases) 2,618,573 2,618,573 2,618,573 2,618,573
100
Appendix 3.4: Changes in quantity and volume in re-
sponse to sale
Regression 3.7 was also run using quantity (Qhtp) and purchase volume (Vhtp; package size ×
quantity) as DVs. It's important to note that UPCs with fewer rolls are easier to stockpile
by purchasing higher quantities (e.g., two four-roll UPCs are easier, in terms of space and
cost, to stockpile than two 24-roll UPCs). The data corroborate thiswhen a household
purchases a single-roll UPC that is not on sale, for example, the average quantity purchased
is 2.391, while the average quantity of twelve-roll UPCs purchased is 1.101. Because low
income households are more likely to purchase smaller sizes, we must account for UPC size
in our quantity regressions. We therefore include our size controls ([Size]pt) in the quantity
regression. The results for the volume and quantity regressions in table 3.30 are consistent
with those from the size regression that were previously reported (and replicated here for
ease of comparison).
Table 3.30: Regression - Change in purchase quantity and volume in response to sale
Size (Sheets) Quantity Volume (Sheets)
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Sale 420.3 21.68 0.18 29.72 778.7 34.14
× INC2 -29.2 -1.39 -0.01 -1.54 -12.2 -0.49
× INC3 -58.4 -2.62 -0.02 -2.99 -44.5 -1.70
× INC4 -112.4 -4.92 -0.03 -5.02 -101.8 -3.82
× INC5 -172.5 -6.46 -0.04 -5.37 -150.2 -4.84
[Demographics]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Time]t Yes Yes Yes
[Product]p Yes Yes Yes
[Channel]ht Yes Yes Yes
[Size]pt Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,285 2,729,285 2,729,285
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Appendix 3.5: Channel switching at beginning of month
Discount stores are one of the primary channels through which households can purchase
larger sizes. Households from each income group purchases larger sizes at discount stores
than at any other channel except warehouse stores (which low income households rarely shop
at). 30.4% of low income households' purchases are made at discount stores during the first
week of the month, compared to 28.8% during other times of the month. This indicates that
low income households may be choosing to purchase at discount stores more often when they
have the liquidity necessary to purchase the larger package sizes that discount stores offer.
However, the summary statistics are merely a cross-sectional snapshot of purchases during
the first week of the month and during other weeksthey may not reflect within-household
changes. They might instead (for example) indicate that households that purchase more
frequently at discount stores are also more likely to purchase during the first week of the
month. To check whether households are indeed more likely to purchase at discount stores
during the first week of the month, we regress a binary variable Discounthtp, equal to one if
product p purchased by household h during shopping trip t was made at a discount store,
on household fixed effects, the first week variable and its interactions with income group
variables, and time controls.
Discounthtp = αh + λI[Week1]ht +
5∑
i=2
λiI[INC = i]I[Week1]ht
+ η2[Demos]ht + η3[Time]t + htp (3.20)
Recall from section 3.5.1 that the channel controls included in our previous analyses
implicitly assume that low income households would not change channels in response to
an increase in income or liquidity. The results of this regression (Table 3.31) indicate that
this is not the caselow income households are in fact more likely to purchase at discount
stores during the first week of the month, when they have greater liquidity. This, in turn,
indicates that the inclusion of channel controls in our analyses may lead us to underestimate
the magnitude of effects under study, and that the results presented in this paper are likely
to be conservative in nature.
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Table 3.31: Frequency of purchasing at discount stores
Est. t-stat
First Week 0.0047 3.45
× INC2 -0.0020 -1.28
× INC3 -0.0014 -0.83
× INC4 -0.0036 -2.25
× INC5 -0.0033 -1.70
[Demographics]ht Yes
[Time]t Yes
N (purchases) 2,729,315
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